1997-06-21 - fbi+eu mass wiretapping?

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From: “Vladimir Z. Nuri” <vznuri@netcom.com>
To: cypherpunks@Algebra.COM
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From: "Vladimir Z. Nuri" <vznuri@netcom.com>
Date: Sat, 21 Jun 1997 13:20:03 +0800
To: cypherpunks@Algebra.COM
Subject: fbi+eu mass wiretapping?
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Subject: SNET: (fwd) piml] Global telephone tapping system.
Date: Fri, 20 Jun 1997 04:19:01 GMT


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FORWARDED On Thu, 19 Jun 1997 15:19:36 -0400, "Mark A. Smith"
<msmith01@eng.eds.com> wrote:
To: piml@mars.galstar.com
Subject: piml] Global telephone tapping system.
From: "Mark A. Smith" <msmith01@eng.eds.com>
Date: Thu, 19 Jun 1997 15:19:36 -0400

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

     European Union and FBI launch global surveillance system

          -------------------
          From Statewatch,
          25 February 1997,
          London, UK
          -------------------

          "The EU, in cooperation with the FBI of the USA, is launching
          a system of global surveillance of communications to combat
          "serious crime" and to protect "national security", but to do
          this they are creating a system which can monitor everyone
          and everything. The EU will be able to trawl the airwaves for
          "subversive" thoughts and "dissident" views and, with its
          partners, across the globe."

          "It seems extraordinary given the concern over the Police
          Bill in the UK and the "Clipper chip" in the USA that there
          has been no debate over the creation of a global telephone
          tapping system initiated by the EU and the USA and supported
          by Canada, Australia, Norway and Hong Kong."

          "the UK Parliament, like many others in the EU, has been by-
          passed in the most blatant way. To claim as the Home
          Secretary does that the "Memorandum of Understanding" is "not
          a significant document" and to fail to send the main EU
          Council Resolution to parliament for scrutiny is quite
          extraordinary when the Police Bill - which extends police
          surveillance - is going through parliament."

          OVERVIEW

          EU-FBI: global tapping system

          The Council of the European Union and the FBI in Washington,
          USA have been cooperating for the past five years on a plan
          to introduce a global telecommunications tapping system.

          The system takes advantage of the liberalisation of
          telecommunications - where private companies are taking over
          from national telephone systems - and the replacement of
          land/sea based lines and microwave towers by satellite
          communications.

          Telephone lines are now partly land-based or under sea or via
          microwave land-based towers but the new generation of
          telecommunications will be totally satellite based.

          The EU-FBI initiative notes the demise of:

            1. state-owned telephone companies
            2. nationally-based telephone systems is concerned about:
            3. the problems faced with intercepting "mobile" phones and
               encrypted communications and wants to ensure:
            4. there is harmonisation of national laws on interception
            5. to ensure that telecommunications provider business
               cooperate with the police and internal security
            6. the equipment produced has standards which can be
               intercepted
            7. as many countries as possible to sign up and thus create
               a de facto global system (through provisions of
               equipment etc to third countries)

          A related disclosure in a book by Nicky Hager shows that
          instead of "suspects" and "targets" the ECHELON system simply
          trawls the airwaves for "subversive thoughts" in written form
          and increasingly in verbal form.

          ECHELON is run under the 1948 UKUSA agreement by the US, UK,
          Canada, New Zealand and Australia.

          REPORT

          The Trevi decision

          The first reference to this initiative was at a Trevi
          Ministers meeting in December 1991 which decided that:

               "a study should be made of the effects of legal,
               technical and market developments within the
               telecommunications sector on the different
               interception possibilities and of what action
               should be taken to counter the problems that have
               become apparent"

          At the meeting of Trevi Ministers in Copenhagen in June 1993
          they agreed the text of a "questionnaire on phone tapping"
          which was sent to each Member State in July 1993 and to the
          new members (Finland, Sweden and Austria) in September 1993
          (see below).

          EU-FBI linkup

          At the first meeting of the new Council of Justice and Home
          Affairs Ministers in Brussels on 29-30 November 1993 they
          adopted the following Resolution on "the interception of
          telecommunications" which speaks for itself and reproduced
          here in full:

          "COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON THE INTERCEPTION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS

          The Council:

            1. calls upon the expert group to compare the requirements
               of the Member States of the Union with those of the FBI;

            2. agrees that the requirements of the Member States of the
               Union will be conveyed to the third countries which
               attended the FBI meeting in Quantico and were mentioned
               in the memorandum approved by the Ministers at their
               meeting in Copenhagen (Sweden, Norway, Finland
               (countries applying for accession to the European
               Communities), the USA and Canada) in order to avoid a
               discussion based solely on the requirements of the FBI;

            3. approves for practical reasons the extension to Hong
               Kong, Australia and New Zealand (which attended the FBI
               seminar) of the decision on co-operation with third
               countries which was taken at the Ministerial meeting in
               Copenhagen;

            4. hereby decides that informal talks with the above-named
               countries may be envisaged: to that end the Presidency
               and the expert group might, for example, organize a
               meeting with those third countries to exchange
               information."

          Source: "Interception of communications", report to COREPER,
          ENFOPOL 40, 10090/93, Confidential, Brussels, 16.11.93.

          Main Resolution on the "lawful interception of
          communications"

          The draft Resolution on the "lawful interception of
          communications", an initiative by the Netherlands (which set
          out the "Requirements", see below) was discussed in the K4
          Committee in March, April, November and December 1994.

          The JHA Council discussed the draft Resolution in March 1994
          but it was only formally adopted by "written procedure" (by
          telexes to Member States dated 21.12.94, 9.1.95, and 18.1.95:
          source Council of the European Union; the last date is after
          the Resolution was agreed) on 17 January 1995. The decision
          was not published in any form for almost two years - on 4
          November 1996 it finally appeared in the Official Journal.
          The Resolution has three parts: First, the short Resolution
          which says:

               "the legally authorised interception of
               telecommunications is an important tool for the
               protection of national interest, in particular
               national security and the investigation of serious
               crime."

          Second, the "REQUIREMENTS" which place a whole series of
          obligations on: network providers, eg: satellite
          communications networks; and on service providers, who
          provide the equipment for national telecom centres, business,
          groups and individuals. And finally, a Glossary of
          definitions.

          The "Requirements" are based on the needs of "law enforcement
          agencies" (defined as "a service authorised by law to carry
          out telecommunications interceptions") who "require access to
          the entire telecommunications transmitted.. by the
          interception subject" (defined as: "Person or persons
          identified in the lawful authorisation and whose incoming and
          outgoing communications are to be intercepted") who is the
          subject of an "interception order" defined as: "An order
          placed on a network operator/service provider for assisting a
          law enforcement agency with a lawfully authorised
          telecommunications interception."

          The "law enforcement agencies" are required to be provided
          with access not just to the content of a communication, in
          whatever, form, but also "associated data", "post-connection"
          signals (eg: conference calling or call transfer), all
          numbers called, all numbers called by - in both cases even if
          a connection is not made - plus "realtime, fulltime
          monitoring capability", the location of mobile subscribers,
          simultaneous and multiple interceptions "by more than one law
          enforcement agency", and "roaming" by mobile phone users
          "outside their designated home serving area".

          The network operators and service providers are expected to
          provide "one or several" permanent "interfaces from which the
          intercepted communications can be transmitted to the law
          enforcement monitoring facility." And, if they provide
          "encoding, compression or encryption" to the customer they
          must provide it en clair (decrypted) to the law enforcement
          agencies.

          Finally, they are obliged to ensure that:

               "neither the interception target nor any other
               authorised person is aware of any changes made to
               fulfil the interception order... [and] to protect
               information on which and how many interceptions are
               being or have been performed, and not to disclose
               information on how interceptions are carried out."

          Source: "Memorandum of Understanding concerning the lawful
          interception of telecommunications", ENFOPOL 112, 10037/95,
          Limite, Brussels, 25.11.95; this report contains the
          "Memorandum" with the Resolution adopted on 17 January 1965
          attached. The Resolution was published in the Official
          Journal on 4.11.96, ref: C 329 pages 1-6.

          Memorandum of Understanding on the Legal Interception of
          Telecommunications

          The "Memorandum of understanding with third countries" (later
          described as the "Memorandum of Understanding on the Legal
          Interception of Telecommunications") was discussed at the K4
          Committee in November 1994.

          The significance of the "Memorandum" is that it extends the
          agreement on the surveillance of telecommunications to non-EU
          countries who are being invited to adopt it - and with it the
          "Requirements".

          The Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the 15 EU
          Member States on 23 November 1995 at the meeting of the
          Council of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers.

          The contact addresses for signatory countries and for further
          information, which confirms the EU-USA link, should be sent
          to:

            a. Director Federal Bureau of Investigation, Attention:
               Information Resource Division, 10 Pennsylvania Avenue,
               N.W., Washington D.C. 20535

            b. General Secretary of the Council of the European Union,
               FAO The President, Rue de la Loi 175, B-1048 Brussels,
               Belgium."

          The number of signatories to the "Memorandum" is open-ended,
          any country can join providing the existing member states
          agree.

          It invites "participants" because "the possibilities for
          intercepting telecommunications are becoming increasingly
          threatened" and there is a need to introduce "international
          interception standards" and "norms for the telecommunications
          industry for carrying out interception orders" in order to
          "fight.. organised crime and for the protection of national
          security."

          The strategy appears to be to first get the "Western world"
          (EU, US plus allies) to agree "norms" and "procedures" and
          then to sell these products to Third World countries - who
          even if they do not agree to "interception orders" will find
          their telecommunications monitored by ECHELON (see below) the
          minute it hit the airwaves.

          Source: "Memorandum of Understanding concerning the lawful
          interception of telecommunications", ENFOPOL 112, 10037/95,
          Limite, Brussels, 25.11.95.

          "not a significant document" - the Home Secretary

          The Chair of the Select Committee on the European Communities
          in the House of Lords, Lord Tordoff, took up the "Memorandum"
          with the Home Secretary, Michael Howard, in an exchange of
          letters on the Committee~s access to documents for scrutiny.

          On the subject of the "Memorandum of Understanding on the
          Legal Interception of Telecommunications" Mr Howard told Lord
          Tordoff:

               "The Memorandum of Understanding is a set of
               practical guidelines to third countries on the
               lawful interception of telecommunications. It is
               NOT A SIGNIFICANT DOCUMENT and does not, therefore,
               appear to meet the criteria for Parliamentary
               scrutiny of Title VI documents." (emphasis added)

          It is quite clear from this Briefing that the "Memorandum" is
          not an insignificant document concerning as it does a EU-US
          plan for global telecommunications surveillance.

          The "Memorandum" itself is just two pages. It is the full
          text of the "Resolution" attached to it which demonstrates
          its full meaning.

          However, not only did Mr Howard not think the "Memorandum"
          was "a significant document" he also apparently believes the
          attached Resolution also insignificant as he did not submit
          it to the House of Lords Committee for scrutiny prior to its
          adoption in January 1995 or thereafter.

          Source: Correspondence with Ministers, 9th Session 1995-96,
          HL 74, pages 26-29.

          Letter to international standards bodies

          In December 1995 COREPER agreed a letter to be sent out to
          "international standardisation bodies in the field of
          telecommunications" (IEC, ISO and ITU). The letter said:

               "Modern telecommunications systems present the risk
               of not permitting the lawful interception of
               telecommunications if they have not been adapted,
               at the standardisation and design stage, to allow
               such interception."

          These bodies are "invited" to take account of the
          requirements of the Council Resolution of 17 January 1995 and
          told that Member States would be applying "these requirements
          to network operators and providers of services".

          The December 1995 letter to international standards bodies
          and the publication of the main Resolution in November 1996
          in the Official Journal announced to manufacturers of
          equipment and service providers that they will be expected to
          meet the "Requirements" allowing surveillance for any new
          contracts within the EU and via the "Memorandum" that these
          standards would also apply to any countries signing up to it
          - for example, the USA.

          Source: "Draft letter to be sent to the international
          standardisation bodies concerning the Council Resolution of
          17 January 1995 on the lawful interception of
          communications", Council General Secretariat to
          COREPER/COUNCIL, ENFOPOL 166, 12798/95, Limite, 14.12.95.

          Letter to non EU countries

          At its meeting on 28-29 November 1996 the Council of Justice
          and Home Affairs Ministers agreed a "draft letter" prepared
          by the K4 Committee to "non EU participants in the informal
          international Law Enforcement Telecommunications Seminar".

          "The letter.. informs you of the wider international support
          for the "Requirements" annexed to the Council Resolution.

          The Council considers that the lawful monitoring of
          telecommunications systems is an important tool in the
          prevention and detection of serious crimes and in
          safeguarding national security. Mindful of new technological
          developments in the field of telecommunications, the Council
          adopted the Resolution of 17 January, 1996 laying down
          technical Requirements, for the lawful interception of
          telecommunications. The Member States of the European Union
          have been called upon to apply those Requirements to
          telecommunications operators and service providers...

          The "Requirements" have been discussed by interception
          experts from EU Member States with colleagues from other
          countries which are equally concerned to ensure that adequate
          technical provision is made for legally authorized
          interception in modern telecommunications technologies.
          Arising from those discussions which have taken place during
          a seminar, the Council of the European Union has received
          expressions of support for the Requirements from Australia,
          Canada, Norway and the United States of America. In
          particular, the relevant authorities In those countries have
          undertaken to (i) have the Requirements taken into account in
          their appropriate national policies and (ii) use the
          Requirements as a basis for discussions with the
          telecommunications industry, standards bodies and
          telecommunications operators...

          You are invited to take note of this letter for the purpose
          of your further discussions with the telecommunications
          industry standards bodies and telecommunications operators.

          The President, for the Council of the European Union."

          Source: "Draft letter to non EU participants in the informal
          international Law Enforcement Telecommunications Seminar
          regarding the Council Resolution", ENFOPOL 180, 11282/96,
          Limite 6.11.96.

          Behind the scenes

          Behind the formal decisions and letters the various Working
          Parties under the K4 Committee were at work on the details.

          In January 1995 the Police Cooperation Working Group, which
          comes under the K4 Committee, considered a report by the UK
          delegation on the problems presented by the next generation
          of satellite-based telecommunications systems which should be
          able to:

               " ~"tag" each individual subscriber in view of a
               possibly necessary surveillance activity."

          The report said that the new mobile individual communications
          working through satellites were already underway and unlike
          the current earth-bound systems based on GSM-technology would
          "in many cases operate from outside the national territory".

          The rationale for the plan was that these new systems:

               "will provide unique possibilities for organised
               crime and will lead to new threats to national
               security".

          The report said all the new systems have to have the
          capability to place all individuals under surveillance - the
          product of "tagging" individual phone lines could therefore
          easily be extended to political activists, "suspected"
          illegal migrants and others.

          The fact that the new systems were being developed by large
          private international corporations, not national state-run
          systems, created "unusual problems for the legally permitted
          surveillance of telecommunications". The first problem to
          surface, according to the report, was that:

               "initial contacts with various consortia... has met
               with the most diverse reactions, ranging from great
               willingness to cooperate on the one hand, to an
               almost total refusal even to discuss the question."

          It goes on to say:

               "it is very urgent for governments and/or
               legislative institutions to make the new consortia
               aware of their duties. The government will also
               have to create new regulations for international
               cooperation so that the necessary surveillance will
               be able to operate."

          Another "problem" for surveillance under the new systems is
          that satellites will communicate with earth-bound stations
          which will function as distribution points for a number of
          adjoining countries - there will not be a distribution point
          in every country. While the existing "methods of legally
          permitted surveillance of immobile and mobile
          telecommunications have hitherto depended on national
          infrastructures" (italics added). The:

               "providers of these new systems do not come under
               the legal guidelines used hitherto for a legal
               surveillance of telecommunications."

          The report says it would be difficult to monitor the "upward
          and downward connections to the distribution point" so the
          "tag" would start the surveillance at "the first earthbound
          distribution point".

          Due to the number of different countries that might be
          involved in making a connection it has been agreed that the
          following "relevant data" should be provided: "the number of
          the subscriber calling, the number of the subscriber being
          called, the numbers of all subscribers called thereafter".
          The report uses the example of a subscriber who is a national
          of country A, with a telephone subscription in country B
          (supplying the relevant data for the "tag"), who occasionally
          uses the system in country C which uses the distribution
          point in country D (which conducts the surveillance) and who
          is in contact with a person in country E concerning a
          suspected serious crime in country F.

          The report with a series of recommendations including
          amendments to national laws to "ensure that surveillance will
          be possible within the new systems" and that "all those who
          are involved in planning the new systems" should be made
          aware of "the demands of legally permitted surveillance".

          A later report from the same Working Party, in June 1995,
          concludes:

               "These new telecommunications systems have much in
               common with existing mobile phone systems... [and]
               will very quickly develop into a global problem,
               which looks like it can only be controlled by
               global cooperation of a hitherto unknown degree."

          Sources: "Legally permitted surveillance of
          telecommunications systems provided from a point outside the
          national territory", report from the UK delegation to the
          Working Group on Police Cooperation, ENFOPOL 1, 4118/95,
          Restricted, 9.1.95; Report from the Presidency to the Working
          Group on Police Cooperation, ENFOPOL 1, 4118/2/95 REV 2,
          Limite, 2.6.95.

          Questionnaire on "national law regarding phone tapping"

          In November 1995 while the EU Ministers were signing the
          "Memorandum of Understanding" for non-EU countries a Working
          Party under the K4 Committee was considering a report from
          the Spanish delegation on national laws within the EU on
          phone tapping surveillance.

          The 1995 report opens with the cynical observation:

               "As it was foreseeable, all states which have
               answered the questionnaire guarantee the
               confidentiality of private communications either by
               their constitution or their Basic Law, or both, in
               accordance with Article 8 of the European
               Convention on Human Rights."

          However, it goes on to observe, and assume, "under certain
          conditions the interception of telecommunications" is
          allowed.

          The report says the country surveys showed - and this is of
          crucial importance regarding surveillance by ECHELON (see
          below) that:

               "At the moment there does not seem to be a legal
               problem for interception that depends on the kind
               of device used for the transmission of voice, text,
               data or images"

          This is a reference to forms of "written" communications or
          "images" sent by e-mail, fax, and telex.

          It summarises the legal positions as: the following countries
          "can simply" make changes in the penal procedure: Germany,
          Austria, Denmark, Luxembourg, Spain and Portugal, while
          Belgium, France, the UK, Ireland, Greece, Norway and Sweden
          require new legislation, with a combination of both in Italy.

          Discussions had taken place, the report says, on the "great
          advantages" the police have if: "they can keep people under
          surveillance on the grounds of suspicion of criminal
          activity". Some countries require objective evidence of an
          offence before surveillance can start but in Austria a
          request for a phone tap "leads automatically to an
          investigation being opened".

          Another problem addressed was the right of individual's to be
          informed about phone tapping (Article 6.3 in relation to
          Article 8 of the ECHR):

               "Obviously such information prejudices the result
               of the police investigation. Therefore, each
               country has to arrange for a procedure to legally
               delay notification."

          The report recommends the Danish system where a lawyer is
          appointed by the Justice Ministry who represents the
          interests of the person to be placed under surveillance at a
          private hearing but is not allowed to tell the person
          concerned.

          The survey found that the maximum duration of authorisation
          varied from 2 weeks to 4 months.

          The report concludes that phone tapping "is justified by a
          serious offence" where "a punishment of imprisonment of one
          year or more" is available to fight "organised crime". Yet
          again the justification for combating "organised crime" is so
          widely drawn - sentences of just one year or more - that the
          purpose of surveillance has to be fundamentally questioned.

          Source: "Report on the national laws regarding the
          questionnaires on phone tapping", Report from the Spanish
          Presidency to the Working Group on Police Cooperation,
          ENFOPOL 15, 4354/2/95 REV 2, Restricted, 13.11.95.

          Who is going to pay for it?

          One issue on which the reports from the K4 Committee are
          silent is who is to pay the costs for the special facilities
          needed under the "Requirements" of law enforcement agencies -
          network and service providers or the governments?

          However, a report produced by the German government, says
          that the costs are going to be astronomical. It estimates
          that to set up surveillance of mobile phones alone will cost
          4 billion D-Marks.

          Source: draft report, dated 5 May 1995, from the German
          government on the "problems and solutions regarding the
          surveillance of telecommunications".

          The "ECHELON" connection

          "ECHELON" is a world-wide surveillance system designed and
          coordinated by the US NSA (National Security Agency) that
          intercepts e-mail, fax, telex and international telephone
          communications carried via satellites and has been operating
          since the early 1980s - it is part of the post Cold War
          developments based on the UKUSA agreement signed between the
          UK, USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand in 1948.

          The five agencies involved are: the US National Security
          Agency (NSA), the Government Communications Security Bureau
          (GCSB) in New Zealand, Government Communications Headquarters
          (GCHQ) in the UK, the Communications Security Establishment
          (CSE) in Canada and the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) in
          Australia.

          The system has been exposed by Nicky Hager in his 1996 book,
          Secret Power: New Zealand's role in the International Spy
          Network. He interviewed more than 50 people who work or have
          worked in intelligence who are concerned at the uses of
          ECHELON.

               "The ECHELON system is not designed to eavesdrop on
               a particular individual's e-mail or fax link.
               Rather, the system works by indiscriminately
               intercepting very large quantities of
               communications and using computers to identify and
               extract messages from the mass of unwanted ones."

          There are three components to ECHELON:
            1. The monitoring of Intelsats, international
               telecommunications satellites used by phone companies in
               most countries. A key ECHELON station is at Morwenstow
               in Cornwall monitoring Europe, the Atlantic and the
               Indian Ocean.

            2. ECHELON interception of non-Intelsat regional
               communication satellites. Key monitoring stations are
               Menwith Hill in Yorkshire and Bad Aibling in Germany.

            3. The final element of the ECHELON system is the
               surveillance of land-based or under-sea systems which
               use cables or microwave tower networks.

          At present it is thought ECHELON's effort is primarily
          directed at the "written form" (e-mails, faxes, and telexes)
          but new satellite telephones system which take over from old
          land-based ones will be as vulnerable as the "written word".

          Each of the five centres supply "Dictionaries" to the other
          four of keywords, phrases, people and places to "tag" and the
          tagged intercept is forwarded straight to the requesting
          country.

          It is the interface of the ECHELON system and its potential
          development on phone calls combined with the standardisation
          of "tappable" telecommunications centres and equipment being
          sponsored by the EU and the USA which presents a truly global
          threat over which there are no legal or democratic controls.

          Source: "Exposing the global surveillance system", Nicky
          Hager. CovertAction Quarterly, Winter 1996-97, pages 11-17.

          CHRONOLOGY

          December 1991
          A meeting of the Trevi Ministers decide a study should be
          carried out on the new telecommunications systems and "the
          different interception possibilities".

          29-30 November 1993
          The first meeting of the new, post-Maastricht, Council of
          Justice and Home Affairs Ministers meeting in Brussels adopt
          a Resolution calling on experts to compare the needs of the
          EU "with those of the FBI".

          March, April, November and December 1994
          The K4 Committee discusses the draft Resolution on the lawful
          interception of telecommunications and the "Requirements" to
          be placed on network and service providers.

          March 1994
          The Council of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers discuss the
          draft Resolution.

          November 1994
          The K4 Committee discusses the draft "Memorandum of
          Understanding with third countries".

          9 January 1995
          The Working Group on Police Cooperation, under the K4
          Committee, considers a report on the need to "tag" all
          communications.

          17 January 1995
          The Resolution is adopted by "written procedure". It is not
          published in any form until 4 November 1996 when it appears
          in the Official Journal.

          13 November 1995
          The Working Group on Police Cooperation consider a report on
          the situation in each EU state on telephone tapping.

          23 November 1995
          The Council of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers agree the
          "Memorandum of Understanding". It is not published in any
          form.

          December 1995
          COREPER agree the text of a letter to be sent to
          international standards bodies attaching the Resolution.

          7 May 1996
          Michael Howard, the Home Secretary, tells the Chair of the
          Select Committee on the European Communities in the House of
          Lords that the "Memorandum of Understanding on the legal
          interception of communications" is "not a significant
          document".

          28 November 1996
          The Council of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers agree the
          text of a letter to be sent out to other potential
          "participants" (countries) in the "Memorandum of
          Understanding".

          Council of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers
          Set up under Title VI, Article K, of the Maastricht Treaty.
          First meet on 29 November 1993 when it took over from the
          Trevi Group and the Ad Hoc Group on Immigration.

          K4 Committee
          Also set up under the Maastricht Treaty to coordinate the
          work on the "third pillar" - policing, immigration and
          asylum, and legal cooperation. Is comprised of senior
          officials from Interior Ministries and prepares report to go
          to the Council.

          Under the K4 Committee there are three Steering Groups
          covering policing and customs, immigration and asylum, and
          legal cooperation (civil and criminal) to which a series of
          Working Groups report.

          COREPER
          The Committee of Permanent Representatives from each EU state
          based in Brussels.

     -----------------------------------------------------------------------
     Copyright: Statewatch, February 1997. Material in this report may be
     used provided the source is acknowledged.

     Statewatch, PO Box 1516, London N16 0EW
     tel: 00 44 181 802 1882
     fax: 00 44 181 880 1727
     e-mail: statewatch-off@geo2.poptel.org.uk


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///,        ////             Mark A. Smith
\  /,      /  >.
 \  /,   _/  /.                  * * *
  \_  /_/   /.
   \__/_   <          UNITED STATES THEATRE COMMAND
   /<<< \_\_
  /,)^>>_._ \          email:  msmith01@flash.net
  (/   \\ /\\\       http://www.flash.net/~msmith01           
       // ````      
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_______________________________________
Charles L Hamilton  (chasm@insync.net)  Houston, TX
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