1997-09-12 - Re:

Header Data

From: “Brian B. Riley” <brianbr@together.net>
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Message Hash: 56193f861b5009292ac6316b688ee7515642f36fee8c8e495aad04ff23789cd5
Message ID: <199709122333.TAA01905@mx02.together.net>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1997-09-12 23:55:14 UTC
Raw Date: Sat, 13 Sep 1997 07:55:14 +0800

Raw message

From: "Brian B. Riley" <brianbr@together.net>
Date: Sat, 13 Sep 1997 07:55:14 +0800
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re:
Message-ID: <199709122333.TAA01905@mx02.together.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



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On 9/12/97 1:31 AM, Anonymous (nobody@REPLAY.COM)  passed this wisdom:

 [snip]

>Now think about this: You're Joe Random Govt. Worker at the 
>official secret key repository, and there's a budget crisis going 
>on - instead of paychecks, you're getting I.O.U.'s. Your terminal 
>has access to thousands, perhaps millions, of secret keys. You grab 
>one of CitiBank's, forge a few transactions, and 30 seconds later 
>your Swiss bank account is a few million dollars fatter and 
>according to the digital signature, the transaction originated in 
>L.A.. 

 Please correct me if I am wrong, but could not a GAK backdoor be
written that will simply permit decryption only of the ciphertext and
not encryption. Would not this prevent this from happening?

  Don'tget me wrong. It scares the hell out of me too, but maybe, in
addition to that various things Tim has suggested we might also
consider how to make the GAK as secure as cam be to minimize its
potential for disaster.

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Brian B. Riley --> http://www.macconnect.com/~brianbr
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  "The only thing necessary for evil to triumph, is for good men to 
   stand by and do nothing"  Edmund Burke







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