1997-10-24 - secret sharing (Re: CDR design document)

Header Data

From: Adam Back <aba@dcs.ex.ac.uk>
To: JonWienk@ix.netcom.com
Message Hash: 8b96a8b7947a6720265bfd5e3887d186f68247c014179be9a36b1321b24a6cfd
Message ID: <199710241324.OAA01401@server.test.net>
Reply To: <3.0.3.32.19971023073713.031381e0@popd.netcruiser>
UTC Datetime: 1997-10-24 15:31:41 UTC
Raw Date: Fri, 24 Oct 1997 23:31:41 +0800

Raw message

From: Adam Back <aba@dcs.ex.ac.uk>
Date: Fri, 24 Oct 1997 23:31:41 +0800
To: JonWienk@ix.netcom.com
Subject: secret sharing (Re: CDR design document)
In-Reply-To: <3.0.3.32.19971023073713.031381e0@popd.netcruiser>
Message-ID: <199710241324.OAA01401@server.test.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




Jon Wienke <JonWienk@ix.netcom.com> writes:
> At 10:55 PM 2/21/97 GMT, Adam Back wrote:
> >
> >Here is a proposal for consideration for inclusion in the OpenPGP
> >standard:
> >
> >	http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/cdr/
> 
> Great work, Adam!  Pursuant to some of the recent rants on cypherpunks, I
> would like to see a proposal for a secret sharing mechanism that would
> allow the recovery of a storage-only key with m of n shares in the event
> that the passphrase to the storage key is unavailable, with the following
> attributes:

I think PGP Inc are considering secret sharing for later versions.
Perhaps it is too much for this iteration?

Secret sharing is nice, I agree, but can be complex too: what if it's
3 of 5, and one of the 5 leaves to join a competitor, can you
redistribute the share without creating a new key without losing
security?  What new packets would be required, etc.

Adam
-- 
Now officially an EAR violation...
Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/

print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`






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