1997-10-21 - Re: Remailers and ecash (fwd)

Header Data

From: Fisher Mark <FisherM@exch1.indy.tce.com>
To: “‘cypherpunks’” <cypherpunks@cyberpass.net>
Message Hash: e93269292ac044e18c4617e993ee81a7ff8dbdb3de0e726dccd01c1b97de2974
Message ID: <2328C77FF9F2D011AE970000F84104A74933C2@indyexch_fddi.indy.tce.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1997-10-21 18:01:52 UTC
Raw Date: Wed, 22 Oct 1997 02:01:52 +0800

Raw message

From: Fisher Mark <FisherM@exch1.indy.tce.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Oct 1997 02:01:52 +0800
To: "'cypherpunks'" <cypherpunks@cyberpass.net>
Subject: Re: Remailers and ecash (fwd)
Message-ID: <2328C77FF9F2D011AE970000F84104A74933C2@indyexch_fddi.indy.tce.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Picking up a thread of a few weeks ago (sometimes life intervenes)...

What I propose is:
	employee -> encryptor -> email -> remailer -> delivermail ->
recipient -> decrypt
which forces the opponent to both monitor traffic much more closely (to
get around the traffic analysis-resistance of remailers) and to decrypt
the actual messages.  The point being to force the opponent to employ
other, less safe (more chance of discovery) techniques, like bribing
your employees or sending in agents as employees of the cleaning
company, etc., etc.   This use of remailers I think could be worth money
to corporations.

Unless you are a truly huge corporation, you are not going to be in a
position to set up private email links with everyone you need a private
email link to.  Using the Internet, while deploying security measures
appropriate to the application, is just too cost-effective.  My proposal
is just that using encryption and remailers together gives you more
security than either technique will alone, perhaps enough that
commercial remailers could flourish.
==========================================================
Mark Leighton Fisher          Thomson Consumer Electronics
fisherm@indy.tce.com          Indianapolis, IN
"Their walls are built of cannon balls, their motto is
'Don't Tread on Me'"






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