1998-02-09 - Re: Laptop TEMPEST

Header Data

From: Ryan Lackey <rdl@mit.edu>
To: Jim Choate <ravage@ssz.com>
Message Hash: 296a25909877bccbcd73dd8a91983c28a951ea8ef80fa2222ac70a023d823232
Message ID: <tw7iuqput8o.fsf@the-great-machine.mit.edu>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1998-02-09 07:44:54 UTC
Raw Date: Mon, 9 Feb 1998 15:44:54 +0800

Raw message

From: Ryan Lackey <rdl@mit.edu>
Date: Mon, 9 Feb 1998 15:44:54 +0800
To: Jim Choate <ravage@ssz.com>
Subject: Re: Laptop TEMPEST
Message-ID: <tw7iuqput8o.fsf@the-great-machine.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



FCC RF/EMC testing is well nigh useless for TEMPEST protection.

Compliance engineering firms have some equipment which might be useful
for TEMPEST experimentation, but the actual specs for Class B (Class A
is basically anything that won't kill you) are pretty worthless for
this application.

I imagine there may be some other "dual use" technologies through for
testing TEMPEST equipment.  Perhaps some medical equipment has stringent
stray emanation specs?

I believe the equipment you'd really want is the real "TS" (technical
surveillance) gear, which is 1) not available on the open market and 2)
expensive.  The paper seems to have involved an AM radio and an obsolete
piece of British TS kit; van Eck used a modified TV.  Any HAM could
probably build a suitable receiver, the real problem is knowing how much
attenuation is necessary to defeat the real TS gear.  This is why I am
fundamentally impressed by the obfuscation techniques from the paper, rather
than just straight shielding. 
-- 
Ryan Lackey
rdl@mit.edu
http://mit.edu/rdl/		






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