1994-02-05 - Re: CERT advisory

Header Data

From: rcain@netcom.com (Robert Cain)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (cypherpunks)
Message Hash: ddbb76ed62e46ae57fe3c162fa1f7751ab92de1726172ce92ae29612d99f75eb
Message ID: <199402051944.LAA09776@mail.netcom.com>
Reply To: <9402050055.AA22719@ah.com>
UTC Datetime: 1994-02-05 19:45:41 UTC
Raw Date: Sat, 5 Feb 94 11:45:41 PST

Raw message

From: rcain@netcom.com (Robert Cain)
Date: Sat, 5 Feb 94 11:45:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (cypherpunks)
Subject: Re: CERT advisory
In-Reply-To: <9402050055.AA22719@ah.com>
Message-ID: <199402051944.LAA09776@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain

Eric Hughes sez:
> Since active interception is not nearly so easy as passive listening,

This isn't true of anything but the aether itself or a point to point
wire with integrity.  In any switched or networked system with routing,
active interception is trivial.  That is why D-H has a lower level
of applicability than generally considered.

> it would be appropriate to use a Diffie-Hellman key exchange in this
> situation.  This protocol has no persistent private keys, so the issue
> of keeping a private key around securely is not an issue.

Yes, the one time key usage is an important factor in the D-H.
Nothing can be determined from one session that will help in
breaking another.



Bob Cain    rcain@netcom.com   408-354-8021

           "I used to be different.  But now I'm the same."

--------------PGP 1.0 or 2.0 public key available on request.------------------