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From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
To: paul@hawksbill.sprintmrn.com
Message Hash: 95c9f35dbe65cf12377936fcb39713920dd99c825fb00fc67d271f0c07155b33
Message ID: <199403182059.AA29674@access1.digex.net>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1994-03-18 21:02:20 UTC
Raw Date: Fri, 18 Mar 94 13:02:20 PST

Raw message

From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Fri, 18 Mar 94 13:02:20 PST
To: paul@hawksbill.sprintmrn.com
Message-ID: <199403182059.AA29674@access1.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain

Is the story that Ames sent the secret of the Clipper Chips
to Moscow unlikely? Well, yes. There are no escrow agents because
there aren't any keys yet. Plus, it is unlikely that the specific
design got to him. 

But Dorothy characterizes the entire rumor as absurd and I don't
think that this is the case. It seems entirely plausible to me
that someone in Ames position could severely compromise the Clipper
system. Why? Someone in Ames position would presumably need access
to Clipper encrypted calls to conduct counter-intelligence operations. 
Remember some of the first customers will be the DOJ, a good place
to put a mole. So if someone in Ames wanted a Clipper key, he could
probably ask the escrow agents for it and get it, no questions asked. 

Dorothy uses arguments like Ames wouldn't have a "Need to Know." 
This really isn't a strong point. Ames is accused of being a spy.
Spies, by definition, circumvent "need to know" requirements. 
I believe that they found some documents in Ames possession that
he was not authorized to hold. 

The specific rumor is probably false, but I think that the Ames
case is a perfect proof of what will almost certainly go wrong
with the Clipper system. Someone will rat. History has shown
time and time again that three can keep a secret if two are
dead. Me and the two Clipper Agencies make three.