1995-10-06 - Re: Certificate proposal

Header Data

From: Jeff Weinstein <jsw@netscape.com>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 1e9261e8d1d00466cb788d19b9d7b81550b37a463f1cba5a936a63640a382092
Message ID: <3074D2F3.1E9@netscape.com>
Reply To: <9510021553.AA13756@tis.com>
UTC Datetime: 1995-10-06 06:59:32 UTC
Raw Date: Thu, 5 Oct 95 23:59:32 PDT

Raw message

From: Jeff Weinstein <jsw@netscape.com>
Date: Thu, 5 Oct 95 23:59:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Certificate proposal
In-Reply-To: <9510021553.AA13756@tis.com>
Message-ID: <3074D2F3.1E9@netscape.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain

Hal wrote:
> Jeff Weinstein <jsw@netscape.com> writes:
> >  I think the old idea of a certificate just binding a name and
> >a key is turning out to not be very useful.  That is why Netscape
> >Navigator 2.0 will support x509 version 3 certificates.  They allow
> >arbitrary attributes to be signed into a certificate.  In this new
> >world, you can think of a certificate as a way of binding a key with
> >various arbitrary attributes, one of which may be(but is not
> >required to be) a name.
> OK, so suppose I want to send my credit card number to Egghead Software.
> I get one of these new-fangled certificates from somebody, in which
> VeriSign has certified that key 0x12345678 has hash 0x54321.  I think we
> can agree that by itself this is not useful.  So, it will also bind in
> some attribute.  What will that attribute be?

  It would be some value that would allow the credit card
authorization agency to match it up with the submitted credit
card number.  In the case of MasterCard's SEPP they are using
a salted hash of the Account Number, where the salt value is
unique per account, is secret, and is shared between the
bank and the card holder.


Jeff Weinstein - Electronic Munitions Specialist
Netscape Communication Corporation
jsw@netscape.com - http://home.netscape.com/people/jsw
Any opinions expressed above are mine.