1995-10-18 - Re: Anonymity: A Modest Proposal

Header Data

From: tbyfield@panix.com (t byfield)
To: Hal <hfinney@shell.portal.com>
Message Hash: 65a941c9b5c425c57aa66344b40579afd1c06c6348e17864f8339c2cec597e47
Message ID: <v02120d02acaa97afa587@DialupEudora>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1995-10-18 16:04:01 UTC
Raw Date: Wed, 18 Oct 95 09:04:01 PDT

Raw message

From: tbyfield@panix.com (t byfield)
Date: Wed, 18 Oct 95 09:04:01 PDT
To: Hal <hfinney@shell.portal.com>
Subject: Re: Anonymity: A Modest Proposal
Message-ID: <v02120d02acaa97afa587@DialupEudora>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain

At 6:53 AM 10/18/95, Hal wrote:

>Now, since I have set it up this way, which was about two years ago, I
>have not received a single complaint about operating the remailer at
>alumni.caltech.edu.  Nobody sends me mail saying "your system is
>accepting objectionable messages."  Instead, all the complaints I get are
>about the Portal remailer (averaging one per week, probably).  People
>complain when they receive a message or newsgroup posting that they find
>objectionable.  They don't care if some system is accepting messages.
>They care about the system which is sending them.
>This has always been the weak link in the remailer system: the last
>remailer in the chain takes the political and legal heat.  If there is
>ever a libel or copyright infringement suit, or criminal prosecution,
>against a remailer it will almost certainly be against the last remailer
>in the chain.  Those are the source of the complaints and those are the
>ones which people try to shut down.

        Well, when some folks want to circumvent this kind of last-link
accountability (even if they are the _only_ link), they simply forge their
headers--so why not incorporate that tactic into the remailer net?

        Also, maybe apropos...It seems to me that there should be a way,
within the remailer net, to synthesize forged-path strings with the "Human
ID through insecure channel" remarks you made a few days ago.