1996-03-05 - Re: Remailers run by spooks

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From: tbyfield@panix.com (t byfield)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 942ab6844606dd54faed51351b26bb59c9d711ca9219abceffe56e025d333f4c
Message ID: <v02120d02ad6031aae9c6@DialupEudora>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1996-03-05 05:28:38 UTC
Raw Date: Tue, 5 Mar 1996 13:28:38 +0800

Raw message

From: tbyfield@panix.com (t byfield)
Date: Tue, 5 Mar 1996 13:28:38 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Remailers run by spooks
Message-ID: <v02120d02ad6031aae9c6@DialupEudora>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain

At 12:11 AM 3/4/96, Just Rich wrote:

>However, I also have no doubt that Strassmann and Marlow are spreading
>disinformation and exaggerating their capabilities in an attempt to break
>the web of trust and incite a witch hunt. It won't work. The answer in any
>case is more use of remailers, not less. Just turn up the noise level.
>You already know that nothing is 100% secure, but you do what you can.
>It's a war of attrition.

        Only the shadow and a few bureaucrats know whether spooks have
infiltrated the remailer operators' web of trust. I'd imagine the payoff in
suggesting the possibility would lie in breeding mistrust not among
operators but, rather, among potential users: diminishing the use and
propagation of remailers would lower the overall noise level, making
case-by-case interception and cracking that much more manageable. But this
hall-of-mirrors speculation is really just misguided FUD: improving
protocols, more remailers, and expanding webs of trust are the prize to
keep our eyes on.