1996-06-04 - Anonymous stock TRADING (was Saw this on CNN: )

Header Data

From: ichudov@algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
To: hoz@univel.telescan.com (rick hoselton)
Message Hash: 1d5872b0e5649e77d04b3c4c6ce8ed9edf5748370b6906fac0d2d8c024441f21
Message ID: <199606040240.VAA31145@manifold.algebra.com>
Reply To: <199606032018.NAA03658@toad.com>
UTC Datetime: 1996-06-04 06:22:36 UTC
Raw Date: Tue, 4 Jun 1996 14:22:36 +0800

Raw message

From: ichudov@algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Tue, 4 Jun 1996 14:22:36 +0800
To: hoz@univel.telescan.com (rick hoselton)
Subject: Anonymous stock TRADING (was Saw this on CNN: )
In-Reply-To: <199606032018.NAA03658@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199606040240.VAA31145@manifold.algebra.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text

rick hoselton wrote:
> You might also want to ask Ivan Boeskey(sp?).  I think he's out of 


Which brings up another ignorant question: suppose that I am a 
corporate officer who does receive substantial "insider" information,
for example results of audits, before they become public. What would
prevent such an insider from creating a phony offshore trading company,
and sending orders to that company using cypherpunks technology? 

If we suppose that the agent executing trades (which may even be a
computer, afaik) is trustworthy, the methods to deliver trade orders are
reliable, the computers are protected from van eyck monitoring, and the
officer is not spending too much money openly, what is there to prevent
or prove such violations of the law?

For example, the trading computer can have pseudonym address
xyz@alpha.c2.org, forwarded through a chain of remailers to
place_order@offshore.com.xx, and the officer sends pgp signed and
encrypted trade orders to that address, again through remailers.  What
besides traffic analysis is there to stop such violations?


	- Igor.