1997-01-21 - Re: Newt’s phone calls

Header Data

From: Jeff Barber <jeffb@issl.atl.hp.com>
To: “Phillip M. Hallam-Baker” <hallam@ai.mit.edu>
Message Hash: e7802720bd187203fad5c3c896c74bd3f2448c2a5d6d6e869077345e488f4ddc
Message ID: <199701212014.MAA11069@toad.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1997-01-21 20:14:29 UTC
Raw Date: Tue, 21 Jan 1997 12:14:29 -0800 (PST)

Raw message

From: Jeff Barber <jeffb@issl.atl.hp.com>
Date: Tue, 21 Jan 1997 12:14:29 -0800 (PST)
To: "Phillip M. Hallam-Baker" <hallam@ai.mit.edu>
Subject: Re: Newt's phone calls
Message-ID: <199701212014.MAA11069@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain

Phillip M. Hallam-Baker writes:

> Adam Back <aba@dcs.ex.ac.uk> wrote in article <5bp18k$1cc@life.ai.mit.edu>...

> > It could be worse to have poor crypto, than no crypto,
> I disagree for two reasons,

[ snip]

> The danger in weak crypto is thinking that it is strong crypto. GSM is
> weak crypto but stops the type of snooping the Martins engaged in.
> If you know not to talk about something secret on one then low
> crypto is better than having a signal anyone can pick up on a 
> device from radio shack.

No, the real danger in weak crypto is that the poorly-informed will not
think about it *at all*.  If we had "poor crypto", Newt probably wouldn't
have been embarrassed by this sort of casual interception, and the issue
wouldn't have been raised in the public mind.  But our communications
still wouldn't be safe from more determined attackers.  Brouhahas like
these are good for the pro-(strong-)crypto agenda.

-- Jeff