1992-10-15 - Re: one time pads

Header Data

From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
To: gnu@toad.com
Message Hash: 5d5b98b544ddca1167fefcf884fb753cc1d761f014b8e779949d089d9d8109ee
Message ID: <199210150922.AA09387@well.sf.ca.us>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-15 09:23:21 UTC
Raw Date: Thu, 15 Oct 92 02:23:21 PDT

Raw message

From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Thu, 15 Oct 92 02:23:21 PDT
To: gnu@toad.com
Subject: Re: one time pads
Message-ID: <199210150922.AA09387@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re. your point about security and burglary.  An intruder could copy a
one-time pad, but of course an intruder can also copy the private key to an
RSA system as well.  I'll admit that physical key control is easier with
public key systems: one just keeps one's key disc in one's personal
possession at all times, and keeps a couple of backup copies in the hands of
close trusted friends or family who understand and will take equal
precautions.  One could also design physical storage media which are
intrusion resistant in the sense of self-destructing if tampered with or fed
the wrong password; these would work as well for OTP keys as for RSA keys.

In some conceivable applications, physical security can be insured as a
matter of the vital interests of the participants.  

Again, I'm by no means trying to suggest that OTPs be considered for
particularly wide application.  Rather, that OTPs and a range of other
systems be designed, implemented, and made available so that potential users
can make their own informed choices.
-gg





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