1992-10-10 - +-=*^

Header Data

From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 6ef03568f6c2df4a88c525d8082711fef77352bdb232f3ef1cc7834b1f339267
Message ID: <9210101436.AA00257@soda.berkeley.edu>
Reply To: <199210100906.AA26559@well.sf.ca.us>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-10 14:29:03 UTC
Raw Date: Sat, 10 Oct 92 07:29:03 PDT

Raw message

From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sat, 10 Oct 92 07:29:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: +-=*^
In-Reply-To: <199210100906.AA26559@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9210101436.AA00257@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



George recommends one-time pads.

The key distribution problem for one-time pads is *much* worse than
for public key systems, or even conventional secret key ciphers for
that matter.  You still have to exchange keys without transmission
(i.e. face to face meetings again, or mail, etc.).  Anything that is
secure for exchanging a one-time pad is also secure for exchanging
public keys.  Then you have to do this again when your pad runs out.
The bandwidth required for one-time keys is much higher than for
conventional keys to boot.

But the biggest advantage of public key systems is that I can sign
someone else's key, and if you know my key, then you know his.

To put it more humorously, you will have exchanged cryptographic
fluids with everyone I have as well.  This is a good thing.

Eric





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