1992-10-23 - BBS E-mail policy

Header Data

From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
To: gg@well.sf.ca.us
Message Hash: 799519438648fde1218309159b0490d576bb4989b30a0b16883676e3bfd767b1
Message ID: <9210231845.AA19935@newsu.shearson.com>
Reply To: <199210230930.AA18783@well.sf.ca.us>
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-23 19:44:33 UTC
Raw Date: Fri, 23 Oct 92 12:44:33 PDT

Raw message

From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Fri, 23 Oct 92 12:44:33 PDT
To: gg@well.sf.ca.us
Subject: BBS E-mail policy
In-Reply-To: <199210230930.AA18783@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9210231845.AA19935@newsu.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>

>Voice: yeah, it's a pain in the tail. One thing I thought might be
>interesting is to use two digitisers: one for the voice input, another for a
>keystream which is derived from a radio or TV program signal which can be
>picked up simultaneously by both correspondents.  XOR the two streams
>together and then do whatever you have to do to make the encrypted results
>transmissable.

Its so simple to just built fully digital systems that use real public
key encryption, I don't see why anyone would want to use something
like you are proposing. Your system would provide virtually no real
security.

I really suggest that anyone who is serious about doing this stuff
read unabridged (hardcover only) version of "The Codebreakers" by
Kahn. He gets into lots of historical examples of how stupidly
designed cryptosystems have cost people their lives. Ususally, people
have very poor ideas of what is and isn't secure. I suggest that some
historical perspective may give people more respect for how hard it is
to do this stuff right.

Perry





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