1992-11-16 - Why remailers…

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From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Message Hash: 3d0123214e4f2b0df38cfb9fcf34ee54c8b89841b8c522c7dca561de5bf1cbee
Message ID: <92111601300174076.1041_DHJ41-1@CompuServe.COM>
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UTC Datetime: 1992-11-16 01:37:40 UTC
Raw Date: Sun, 15 Nov 92 17:37:40 PST

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From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Sun, 15 Nov 92 17:37:40 PST
Subject: Why remailers...
Message-ID: <921116013001_74076.1041_DHJ41-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain

Tim mentioned that not many people on the list have expressed
interest in the remailers, and it occurs to me that maybe people
don't all share the vision of why this crypto technology is important.

I'm trying to recall how I learned about the possibilities of this
technology.  I recall reading "True Names" a few years ago.  Vinge had
his netters exchanging mail anonymously.  The hero downloaded a big
batch of messages from a BBS and tried decrypting all of them to see
which were for him.  Okay, I thought, that would be a way of disguising
which messages you were _receiving_.  Then Vinge said something like
"and using more elaborate techniques, the sender of a message could
be hidden as well."  Hold on, I thought.  That will never work.  If
they tap your line, they're going to know exactly what messages you're
sending.  Too bad.  Vinge had a clever idea going, but it's flawed.

I only learned about Chaum's crypto stuff last year.  Somebody on the
Extropians list mentioned PGP, and I'd always had a casual interest
in crypto, so I downloaded it and played with it some.  I thought it
was great and really got into it in a big way.

This got me interested in crypto in general, so I started doing some
library research.  When I found Chaum's stuff, it just blew me away.
The first article I found, I think, was his CACM paper which is an
overview of many of the things that are possible.  I started trying to
track down other papers by Chaum.  Here were all the technologies
needed to make Vinge's world work, technologies which Vinge apparently
knew about long before I did.

It seemed so obvious to me.  Here we are faced with the problems of
loss of privacy, creeping computerization, massive databases, more
centralization - and Chaum offers a completely different direction to
go in, one which puts power into the hands of individuals rather than
governments and corporations.  The computer can be used as a tool to
liberate and protect people, rather than to control them.  Unlike the
world of today, where people are more or less at the mercy of credit
agencies, large corporations, and governments, Chaum's approach balances
power between individuals and organizations.  Both kinds of groups are
protected against fraud and mistreatment by the other.

Naturally, in today's society, with power allocated so disproportionately,
such ideas are a threat to large organizations.  Balancing power would
mean a net loss of power for them.  So no institution is going to pick
up and champion Chaum's ideas.  It's going to have to be a grass-roots
activity, one in which individuals first learn of how much power they
can have, and then demand it.

Where do the remailers fit in?  They represent the "ground floor" of this
house of ideas - the ability to exchange messages privately, without
revealing our true identities.  In this way we can engage in transactions,
show credentials, and make deals, without government or corporate databases
tracking our every move as they can today.  Only by securing the ability to
communicate privately and anonymously can we take the next steps towards
a world in which we each have true ownership and control over information
about our lives.

Chaum's ACM paper is titled, provocatively, "Security Without Identification -
Transaction Systems to Make Big Brother Obsolete."  The work we are doing
here, broadly speaking, is dedicated to this goal of making Big Brother
obsolete.  It's important work.  If things work out well, we may be able
to look back and see that it was the most important work we have ever done.

Hal Finney