From: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 5410f9256c36edb87adc609e2f25f6682d64fb69e2e8991d2c9852ed3ddfc6b0
Message ID: <9212060320.AA03303@soda.berkeley.edu>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1992-12-06 03:21:20 UTC
Raw Date: Sat, 5 Dec 92 19:21:20 PST
From: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu
Date: Sat, 5 Dec 92 19:21:20 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: remailers
Message-ID: <9212060320.AA03303@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Remailers are proliferating! Several more will be coming on line soon!
Two thoughts:
Remailers should keep a directory of other remailers, along with their
keys. They should, at random intervals, send messages to other remailers,
selected at random. They should have a field like
Purpose: traffic-analysis
If a remailer on this "ring" sees this field, it will have, say, a 90%
chance of remailing to another remailer in the ring, again, encrypted and
with the traffic-analsysis field.
This will cause a certain amount of random traffic between remailers. A
traffic-analysis message could bounce around many times before finally
ending up in the great /dev/null.
We need two other things: overseas remailers (for those of us who live
under US law). Domestic (US) remailers could have their archives searched
with a searchwarant. However, if your mail has gone accross the oceans a
few times, it would be pretty much impossible to get the neccessary warrants
and cooperation in all the countries its been through.
I'll set up a European remailer if someone else will.
The other thing we need to do is make a list of remailers and their keys and
put it up for ftp on soda.berkeley.edu in ~ftp/pub/cypherpunks. In fact,
there could be an automatic service, whereby remailers automatically send
mail to a remailer at soda, listed their keys and protocols, and the soda
remailer automatically updates a remailer directory.
e
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1992-12-06 (Sat, 5 Dec 92 19:21:20 PST) - remailers - nobody@soda.berkeley.edu