1992-12-28 - A solution remailer signature suppression

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From: hugh@domingo.teracons.com (Hugh Daniel)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 96d0cbc6a275ae6bd8d9d52d5a6dadffc88cbe2f8aa4a08277aaadf22de6ef85
Message ID: <9212280931.AA08065@domingo.teracons.com>
Reply To: <N3kewB6w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
UTC Datetime: 1992-12-28 09:32:42 UTC
Raw Date: Mon, 28 Dec 92 01:32:42 PST

Raw message

From: hugh@domingo.teracons.com (Hugh Daniel)
Date: Mon, 28 Dec 92 01:32:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: A solution remailer signature suppression
In-Reply-To: <N3kewB6w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
Message-ID: <9212280931.AA08065@domingo.teracons.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  There are very good reasons to build remailers (and all mail tools)
to pass on all the bytes they can, trailing spaces and .sigs included.
  Might I sugjest that we set up the remailers with a feature where it
tests mail sent from its owner to make sure there is no "compromising"
content and that the outer shell verifies correctly, if it fails
either of these tests it is dumped in a file and a note returned to
you saying someings not right.
  This has two good features, first you know that what you send out is
good looking stuff and that if someone complains that its likely the
falut of some machine between the two of you and not you.  Second
this gets folks running remailers everywhere just as part of the
infrastructure of using cryptoware.
  Does this sound like something we can build upon for everyone?

		||ugh Daniel





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