From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: edcdcbd7ce332ad241148b81a3c57a5d3c7bcbf549548392c863ef95f5c0e9ec
Message ID: <9301271507.AA12215@toad.com>
Reply To: <9301270659.AA10471@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
UTC Datetime: 1993-01-27 15:08:01 UTC
Raw Date: Wed, 27 Jan 93 07:08:01 PST
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 93 07:08:01 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Computerized OTP (was 5th AMENDMENT & DECRYPTION)
In-Reply-To: <9301270659.AA10471@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
Message-ID: <9301271507.AA12215@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Murdering Thug wrote:
> Yes I do think the idea of making a "more random than random" stream
> by filtering out long runs of 0's or 1's weakens the the key stream
> in theory, but in practical use it strengthens it, because if the stream
> is left alone, runs of 500 bits of 0's or 1's can come through, and any
> fool can then extract plain text using XOR in this area of the cyphertext.
this is a one in 2^500 event. just to remind you, 2^500 is
3,273,390,607,896,141,870,013,189,696,827,599,152,216,642,046,043,064,789,483,291,368,096,133,796,404,674,554,883,270,092,325,904,157,150,886,684,127,560,071,009,217,256,545,885,393,053,328,527,589,376
(sorry to those folks whose screens get bugged by looooong lines.)
i wouldn't worry about a 1 in 2^500 event occurring too often ...
peter
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