From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Message Hash: 4887befad83bc995976a76f856bdf7c4acfb372eb029aa502f1d72b2b78aed58
Message ID: <93022303360374076.1041_DHJ26-1@CompuServe.COM>
Reply To: _N/A
UTC Datetime: 1993-02-23 04:34:43 UTC
Raw Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 20:34:43 PST
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 20:34:43 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: Remailer to anon.penet.f
Message-ID: <930223033603_74076.1041_DHJ26-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Chael Hall points out that remailer operators who use their personal
accounts for the remailing are vulnerable to having their anon.penet.fi
pseudonyms (if any) discovered by users who request remailing to that
site.
For those operating remailers based on the Perl scripts originally
written by Eric Hughes which I modified, I use the following maildelivery
file to prevent the attack Chael mentioned:
#
# field pattern action/ string
# result (quote included spaces)
#
Request-Remailing-To anon.penet.fi file A Bitbucket
Anon-To anon.penet.fi file A Bitbucket
Request-Remailing-To "" pipe A remail.pl
Anon-To "" pipe A remail.pl
Encrypted PGP pipe A pgpmail.pl
* "" pipe ? recurse.pl
This puts any message to anon.penet.fi into a file called Bitbucket.
My slocal.pl script does not support the slocal/maildelivery feature
which deletes a message, so this is the closest I can come. (I suppose
another alternative would be to pipe it into "cat > /dev/null". That
would look like:
Request-Remailing-To anon.penet.fi pipe A "cat > /dev/null"
I haven't tried this one.)
BTW, if anyone has made changes to the remailer scripts, please send
them to me. I would like to clean up the scripts a little, add more
error checking, and submit a new version to the FTP site.
Hal Finney
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1993-02-23 (Mon, 22 Feb 93 20:34:43 PST) - Remailer to anon.penet.f - Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>