1993-02-23 - anonymous return addresses

Header Data

From: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 9dcb3d1030430f2dc1dfefcf8203a26a4465206200764187efa2897f46c1aeb2
Message ID: <9302231856.AA13893@toad.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1993-02-23 18:56:17 UTC
Raw Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 10:56:17 PST

Raw message

From: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 10:56:17 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: anonymous return addresses
Message-ID: <9302231856.AA13893@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The recent penet troubles are a reminder that secure anonymous return
addresses are a lot harder than secure anonymous mail with no return
capability.  Maybe it's time to go over the options available to us
for anonymous return?

  1. Remailer memorizes a pseudonym.  I don't like this, mainly because
     it leaves the remailer operator vulnerable to pressure to reveal
     the correspondence between real and anonymous id's.  It
     also opens up about a million possible security holes, as
     we've noticed.

  2. The anonymous message includes a cryptographic "stamped
     self-addressed envelope" which contains a layered list of
     remailer addresses encrypted at each layer.  This requires
     modified behavior of remailers; they must be willing to "unwrap"
     an address-list separately from the message body, and then
     "wrap" the entire message with the destination's public key,
     in order to disguise the correspondence between input and output.
     I think this has been discussed here before.  Has anyone
     implemented it?
        I strongly suggest that this method be implemented in
     the cypherpunks remailers.  Let's call it the SASE feature.
     What do you think?

  3. The reply to an anonymous message can be posted in a public place
     encrypted for a key known only to the sender.

Have I missed any important methods?

-- Marc Ringuette (mnr@cs.cmu.edu)





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