1993-03-03 - Wasted BAndwidth

Header Data

From: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 0dc55758a26f3f4e8f5b58cec5bc4cae2452e5144d3c892802e011bc2a22faa6
Message ID: <9303031817.AA05176@netcom.netcom.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1993-03-03 18:18:37 UTC
Raw Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 10:18:37 PST

Raw message

From: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 10:18:37 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Wasted BAndwidth
Message-ID: <9303031817.AA05176@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain

Forwarded message:
> 	You are right that because of the right free speach, it is
> impossible to prohibit remailers.  However, while I don't believe in
> prior restraint; but I do believe in personal responsibility.  It is
> certainly true that it is possible to construct a remailer service,
> using cryptography, such that it would be impossible to trace it back to
> the original sender.  This class of remailer would generally not provide
Well Ted I am not here to make ad-hominen attacks AND... 
there are a number of issues raised... 

Personal responsibility is a choice accepted by the person exercising
THEIR right of free speech... it is important to remember
that it is #1 and foremost a CHOICE... you CANT force an
attitude of personal responsibility

> So in this model, how can you provide personal responsibility?  Well, I
> would argue that the buck should stop at the remailer site.  They are
> the closest link to the chain of liability, and they have intentionally
> performed measures which make it impossible find the next link in the
> chain of liability.  So, let the liability rest with the remailer site!
> Now, I'm not a lawyer, and as far as I know, this legal theory hasn't
> been tested in a court.  So only time will tell what happens when these
> remailers hit the real world.
> As far as remailers like Julf's are concerned, I very much like the idea 
> which Tim Moors suggested --- which is to have some method which the
> identity between the input and output address could be revealed.  This
> provides general anonymity, but one that can be breached when someone
> has abused that anonymity, as convicted by a jury of their peers.
> Perhaps the way this could be reflected into the "real world" legal
> system is that remailers which do keep a mapping between input and
> output addresses, and which are willing to reveal them under appropriate
> circumstances, would be exempt from being held liable for what comes out
> of their remailer.
> Perhaps these are not the right sets of tools to be used to provide some
> sort of controls over remailers so that the negative effects of these
> remailers can be controlled.  But it is our responsibility to consider
> them, and not just pretend they don't exist.   I hope we don't have the
> attitude of "Vonce the rockets go up, who cares vere they come down?
> That's not my department....."
> 						- Ted

 Ted ,
	you seem more concerned with how you and the particular cabal
who agrees with you are going to control how others use their machines
and software to ensure THEIR right of choice...
Sorry but the attitudes you personally espouse just dont wash in the real
world...Liability law is civil LAW... in most cases there are NO
treaties between countries for laws such as libel...
Anonymity will flourish... and in the VERY near future... it wont be
dependent on the good-will of a sysadm or a government...
there simply WONT be the means to control spread of anonymity tools
Your viewpoint brings to mind an OLD saying
"Those who would trade a little freedom for security deserve neither"
and I apologize if I have misquoted here...I am afraid the scam
of social control and responsibilty that you and others such as 
government practice and espouse is about over...
"may you have an Interesting life"
p.s. Atlas is shrugging