1993-03-02 - ideas on an encrypted BSD filesystem (LONG, technical)

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From: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 1afde2f20dcaffd1cb628ee25310e3fec25238e57a105ef831b8d73412744ad4
Message ID: <9303020004.AA01774@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1993-03-02 00:06:22 UTC
Raw Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 16:06:22 PST

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From: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 16:06:22 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ideas on an encrypted BSD filesystem (LONG, technical)
Message-ID: <9303020004.AA01774@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


I have been working on a few ideas I have to make a BSD system (like a
386BSD system on a nice fast PC) into a secure base system for a BBS that
is somewhat "raid-proof".  The basic plan is the encrypt the filesystem and
use public key encryption to separate the system administrator from the
information contained within the system and make it harder to do blanket
searches of computer systems such as those I have seen happen in this area.
Here is a basic outline of what I plan on doing, any comments would be



1. Purpose:

To create a system that offers subscribers/users a greater level of privacy
and security than offered in most BBS/unix systems.  The basic goal is to
make a system somewhat "raid-proof".  Users have the ability to make thier
files encrypted is such a manner that even the system administrator is
unable to access/view the files.  Through such a system I hope to create a
sort of userspace that can allow an administrator to detach themselves from
the actual content of the files in the system in a sort of "common-carrier"
or "bookseller" philosophy that will offer both the admin and the user more
protection from over-zealous law enforcement agents and unauthorized
intruders.  If the users so choose, they can create files that even the
admin cannot access without modifying the system to spoof out keys during

The system is designed to be very difficult (if not impossible) for
external forces to gain access to information contained therein simply
through possession of the physical hardware of the system.  Essentially, I
want to separate the information content of the system from the hardware
(disk drives)  of the system by creating a wall using public key
encryption.  Access to files can be controlled by the users to whom those
files belong.

2. Some general conventions (mostly for lack of ASCII subscripting...):

X_p = X's public key
X_r = X's private key
X_p(X_r) = X's private key encrypted with X's public key
X_p(X_r1,X_r2...) = Private keys X_r1, X_r2, etc encrypted with pubkey X_p
K = one-time key used for encrypting a file
X_p(K) = File key K encrypted using X's public key

In most cases, S_r and S_r are user for the system keys, U_r and U_p for
user keys and G_r and G_p for public group keys.

3. Implementation:

This system will be based upon BSD (386BSD specifically, because the source
is there...) with the hopes of providing a set of low-level privacy and
security options that others can use to provide secure BBS and
general-access unix systems.  The system is in not invulnerable to external
attack and access of user's files without thier consent (known weaknesses
are listed after implementation details), but it tries to make the system
as "raid-proof" as possible. This privacy/security is implemented though
the use of an encrypted filesystem and built-in support for management of
the keys used for this encryption through public key encryption.

3.1 The filesystem 

In general, the system will encrypt the users' files using DES or IDEA
using a one-time random key.  This key will be encrypted with the user
public key and stored with the file.  When the file is accessed the key is
decrypted from the private-key stored in memory and the file key is found
and the file decrypted.  Not all files are encrypted; whether or not a file
is encrypted depends on its permissions.

If a file is world-readable then it is not encrypted, if it does not have
any r, w, or x permissions for world then the file is encrypted and the
one-time key used for the encryption is stored in the inode structure.
This structure contains space for holding both a "users" and a "group"
entry for the encryption key K.  

At this point the DES v IDEA choice depends on whether or not there is any
chip out there to do IDEA in hardware.  If not, I will probably use DES
(double or triple DES maybe...) because I can snag a card to do it and
offload this burden from the basic system.

3.2 Groups

The concept of "group" is also changed.  Basically, I can't see any real
benefit from the current implementation of groups in BSD, so I am going to
dump it all and rebuild something in the holes left behind.  The basic goal
of these "groups" is to implement something more like access control lists
than the standard Berkeley groups.  At the moment, I am thinking of
implementing two types of groups: public and personal.  

3.2.1 ACLs

A personal group is actually an ACL for a particular file.  This group
appears in a ls -g as "user-acl" (i.e. user "jdoe" sees the file's group as 
"jdoe-acl").  The default acl for files contains only the user as a member,
but for each file they can add or remove people from the acl.  This is
implemented by creating a default user-acl entry in the group file and
creating an entry for the user in the systems private acl list.   When a
user modifies the acl for a file a reference to the file is added to the
private acl list and entries foe each user or public group added to the
list are made in the following fashion:

fileref:gid or uid:rwx:(S_p(U_p(K))):gid or uid:rwx:(S_p(U_p(K))...

This holds the user id or group id, thier permissions, and the file key
wrapped in the particular user's public key (the user added to the acl, not
the owner of the file) and this is wrapped with the system public key.

3.2.2 Public groups

The other type of group are the public groups, which are somewhat similar
to the BSD groups, but differ in how they are created and how user's are
added.  Anyone can create a new public group.  This facility is implemented
with an application that simply asks the user for a unique name for the new
group.  When created the person creating the group is added to that group.
From that point on, the membership of groups is controlled by the group
members.  When someone wants to enlist another person in a group, they
sponsor the user, and the other members of the group are sent a message
indicating the person who would be joining and the sponsor (groupnames are
automatically made to be mail aliases for all group members as well).  Each
member of the group has the power to "blackball" a prospective member by
returning a mail message to the group server with a no vote.  Otherwise,
when all members return yes votes, or a specified time period has elasped,
the person is added to the group.

The membership of groups is knowledge that is limited to the members of the
group and the system.  Groupnames and membership is not public knowledge,
and unless you are a member of a group, a ls -g of a file with a particular
group set to it will return only the number (group-name->gid mapping is not
publicly accessible).  The group listing is kept wrapped in the system
public key, and each group is assigned it's own unique public/private
keypair.  The actual users do not know this key, it is held for them by the
system, but they can change thier effective gid if they are a member of a
group through a user command.  The groupfile help by the system holds
groups in the format: 


When a new member is "sponsored" the system uses the U_r of the sponsoring
member to pull out the group private key from this file and puts the
U_p(G_r) of the member they are sponsoring in a file similar to the group
file, but holding "probationary members".  Both the group file and the
holding file for sponsored users are wrapped with the system public key.

3.3 System calls and access to privacy additions

All of the addtions mentioned here are run through the kernel.  User-level
processes have no access to these facilities otther than through a few
functions that will be added.  Specifically, access to the additional
entries in the inode holding the file key K and to the public and private
keys held in memory will only be available to the kernel.  The regular
system calls that access this sort of information (stat, for example) will
return what they normally return under BSD.  Whether or not the data blocks
they may access are encrypted or not is determined by the kernel and the
keys assigned to a particular user process.

There will be a few additional system calls and functions to allow people
to change the group of thier process, perhaps to change the private/public
key running with thier process, and some new user programs to manipulate
the new additions will be created.  For the most part, I am trying to make
the applications and user processes run on top of this system as
transparently as possible.

3.4 General notes

These are just some notes about the system that I am lumping together under
the category of "general".  They include known weaknesses and general notes
on the bahavior and operation of such as system.  

3.4.1 User interface to operations

The only significant difference a user will notice (other than the bizarre
permissions stuff for acls and groups) is a slight modification to the
login sequence.  The user will enter thier login and password as always,
and they will then be prompted for their private key wrapped in the systems
public key.  If successful they will have full access to thier files.  If
not they will still be able to login, but will not have a valid keypair
assigned to them and will be unable to access files they have on the system
that were encrypted.  I ahve not decided yet if the system will broadcast
it's public key to the user before asking for S_p(U_r) or if I should
assume they know it and then let it croak if they are wrong or it has
changed (allowing them to move around in a limited fashion with a process
without a keypair and find the new key).  I believe that the second option
is somewhat better at defeating some spoofing methods, but I am not really

It should be noted that the public/private keypair that I have been talking
about as belonging to specific users should not be a keypair they
distribute.  The key is only for access and encryption of files on the
system and user's would be reminded often to use a completely different
keypair for email, etc.

3.4.2  Known weaknesses

Snooping on the line:
	There is nothing to prevent someone from tapping the line between
	the system and the user.  All such communications are in cleartext
	and by tapping the line in such a way someone can get around the
	privacy safeguards installed in the system (they can see the
	decrypted text come down the wire to the user and don't need to get
	to the hardware).  It would be really nice if I could do this whole
	thing encrypted using public key encryption, but I really don't
	feel like writing the necessary code for client programs so that
	non-technoid users could access the system.

Compromising the system private key:
	Through perhaps the threat of violence or other nasty force,
	someone might be able to get the system private key out of the
	sysadmin.  I have considered adding in a booby-trap of some sort,
	whereby the sysadmin could perhaps transpose a predetermined
	sequence from the private key and invoke a "slash and burn" on the

	The system private key may also be unknowingly compromised if it is
	not guarded carefully by the admin.  This is particularly dangerous
	because it allows someone to essentially crack the entire system
	over time without anyone knowing.  By having access to the system
	private key, the intruder/snooper can concievably snag private keys
	as they come in and decrypt user files, or even change the system
	keys and hold everything hostage...

A few others that I am too tired to write down right now:
	This is basically designed to make it hard for someone to scan
	every user's files just by grabbing the physical hardware.  Down
	here in the land where Steve Jackson Games had something like this
	happen to its BBS I want to make it difficult for the intruder.
	Not impossible, but force them to deal with each individual user as
	more than just another directory to search through and perhaps
	force them to be specific about what they want/are looking for if
	they have proper authority...or maybe make it so that the sysadmin
	could honestly say "Sorry, but even _I_ can't look at that file..." 

3.4.3  System public and private key

It may seem that I am wrapping a lot of stuff in the system public key when
it is not necessarily needed.  This is because I hope to set things up so
that most, if not all, system files are not encrypted.  The system protects
those files or bits of information that might need a little bit more
security through wrapping the piece in the system public key.  The system
private key is entered at the console at boot time (therefore it must
always be booted by hand), the private key entered is tucked away in memory
and is _never_ stored on disk (not even to swap space).  

The system private key seems to be the most important thing to hide,
because if the system private key is discovered, it is possible to run the
system in a spoof-mode or to gain access to a lot of things just through
possesion of the hardware.  If an improper private key is entered at boot
up time things will fail fast because the system will be unable to properly
access most user files and the system will also be unable to attach valid
user private keys to thier processes because it will not be able to decrypt
the S_p(U_r) packages users send at login.  Another reason for sneaking in
S_p as a wrapper for things is that it makes it much more difficult for
someone with possesion of the hardware to substitute in a new
public/private keypair for the system.  They could put it in, but the
files and group lists wrapped with the old key would still be inaccessible.

The method for legitimately changing the system's public and private keys
will require the admin having both the public and private keys for the
system.  This means that if an admin loses the system's private key the
users are screwed, so the admin really needs to make sure this is not lost.
Making a couple of copies on paper and storing them somewhere might not be
a bad idea (I know someone who made a stencil of his asciified PGP private
key and spray-painted it on a couple of walls of abandoned buldings around
town.  It fits in with the other graffiti, is much less fragile than a
floppy disk, and only he knows what the graffiti means... :)


This is my basic outline, I welcome any comments or ideas people have on
beefing this up or problems in it that I may have overlooked.



	-all comm to and from system is encrypted using idea with the
	 session key 

file system:
	-all files compressed and encrypted with IDEA or DES (DES if I can
	 find a nice hardware implementation [the need for speed...] and
	 otherwise IDEA in preference to DES)

	-when a file is read it is pulled up into an area of memory only
	 the system can access and decrypted?