From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: e40a2f9da83e877ca502173700803eccbb32d44969382cfb4773335a70366a9e
Message ID: <9303260725.AA23290@soda.berkeley.edu>
Reply To: <Pine.3.05.9303251227.A7954-d100000@access.digex.com>
UTC Datetime: 1993-03-26 07:30:20 UTC
Raw Date: Thu, 25 Mar 93 23:30:20 PST
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 93 23:30:20 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Distributed anonymous posting (was Re: Many Important Items...)
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9303251227.A7954-d100000@access.digex.com>
Message-ID: <9303260725.AA23290@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
>Anonymous posting has been around as long as
>Usenet, in the form of forged messages.
This is an excellent point of rhetoric. Perhaps we should teach mail
and news forgery as a technique to the defense of privacy? 1/2 :-)
>I have been working through a few ideas for the design of a
>_distributed_ anonymous posting service,
>[...] secret sharing might be used for remailer private keys.
I have convinced myself that some form of secret sharing will be
necessary for a distributed system that is robust against single point
failure. You don't want single point manipulability, either, if you
can get it.
There are two basic ways to proceed: hard nodes, difficult to take
down, or soft nodes, easy to reconfigure around. Both approaches
should be looked at.
Hard nodes are more difficult politically; soft nodes are more
difficult technically.
A soft node necessity: a directory lookup service, distributed,
sharing data. Merely specifying the first point of contact and
alternate paths doesn't cut it. You don't want to have to retry a
bounced message so many times.
Who here knows enough about sendmail to consider the eventual
feasibility of integrating pseudonym lookup into mail transfer?
Eric
Return to April 1993
Return to “sdw@sdwsys.lig.net (Stephen D. Williams)”