From: szabo@techbook.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 13:33:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: WIRETAP: Non-technical statement
In-Reply-To: <9304201609.AA20256@churchy.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <m0nlP2e-000huKC@techbook.techbook.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
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> [proposed press statement]
> ....
> This has come to be known as the
> Wiretap chip since it allows any Law Enforcement agency to automatically
> decrypt any conversations made with it with a search warrant.
> ...

I understand there are some situations where law enforcement agencies
can gain access to keys _without_ a search warrant, and furthermore
access to the keys allows wiretapping of conversations that go well
beyond the scope of the search warrant.  This might be better phrased 
"with, or in many cases even without, a search warrant".

Does anybody know of specific examples of wiretapping without a 
search warrant, or beyond the scope of the search warrant that
we can cite?  Especially famous ones (didn't Nixon wiretap 
somebody?)

Question: does there need to be a warrant to search *both*
parties in a conversation, or just one?  What if one of the parties
is a foreign citizen calling from their homeland?  What about
conference calls?

In addition to lawyer-client and doctor-patient conversations, 
ubiquity of the wiretap chip allows the U.S. government exclusive access 
to recording the following calls under the rubric of a "secure" system:

* husband-wife
* psychologist-client
* priest-confessor
* foreign tourists, businessmen, and diplomats
* international phone calls 
* phone calls outside the U.S. involving Clipper phones
	(last I heard AT&T was planning to
	export the wiretap chip phone, can that be verified?)
* etc.

We might design a special press release to be sent to
the *international* press and foreign companies.  We might especially
target electronics giants like Matsushita, Phillips, Siemens, Fujitsu,
NEC, etc. that can make alternative chips if they feel there is market 
demand for privacy from U.S. spooks who speak of using the wiretap
chip to "enhance U.S. economic competitiveness".  This might be a joint
venture with U.S. companies like Security Technologies Inc. that 
AT&T and the U.S. government have screwed with their collusion.
The vast majority of consumer-product chips are manufactured outside the 
U.S.  It is doubtful that VLSI can compete, much less corner the market 
if international concern is raised over the potential U.S. wiretapping 
monopoly.  

However, we do need to do this in such a way that we do not encourage
foreign government escrow-key schemes.  Let's use the term "wiretap 
chip" for the entire class of escrow-key hardware schemes.  I think
we have a shot at giving the entire class of Denning-style schemes
a bad reputation in the international community.  One desirable
foreign government action would be to ban the import of phone
equipment containing escrow-key chips from the U.S.; a very
undesirable outcome is for foreign governments to set up their
own escrow-key systems.   Primarily, we want to give wiretap
chips a bad reputation in the market.

We also need to dig up information on the phone call archives being
kept by the NSA and other agencies.  How extensive are they?  Is
there any guarantee phone calls will be deleted after some period,
or are phone calls once tapped stored forever on some CD-ROM?
Can foreign companies operating in the U.S. have any confidence that
the U.S. government is not wiretapping their phones, gleaning trade
secrets and distributing them to favored U.S. megacorps like AT&T?
If we don't have answers to these questions we need to ask them,
in public and often.

Nick Szabo					szabo@techbook.com