From: Joseph Truitt <joseph@valis.biocad.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 18:30:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: [fwd] Initial EFF analysis of Clinton Privacy and Security Proposal
Message-ID: <9304170040.AA21888@valis.biocad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I don't recall having posted to this list before, but I am a truly
supportive lurker as it were, doing my bit to sow seeds of crypto-anarchy
at the layperson level to many friends.

Anyway, in light of today's foreboding announcement from the White House, I
thought you might be interested in this blurb from the EFF.

------- Forwarded Message

Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 15:17:02 -0400
From: Cliff Figallo <fig@eff.org>
Subject: EFFector Online 5.06
To: eff-news@eff.org (eff-news mailing list)

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EFFector Online Volume 5 No. 6       4/16/1993       editors@eff.org
A Publication of the Electronic Frontier Foundation   ISSN 1062-9424

...

                       April 16, 1993

      INITIAL EFF ANALYSIS OF CLINTON PRIVACY AND SECURITY  
                           PROPOSAL

       The Clinton Administration today made a major announcement 
on cryptography policy which will effect the privacy and security of 
millions of Americans.  The first part of the plan is to begin a 
comprehensive inquiry into major communications privacy issues 
such as export controls which have effectively denied most people 
easy access to robust encryption as well as law enforcement issues 
posed by new technology.

       However, EFF is very concerned that the Administration has 
already reached a conclusion on one critical part of the inquiry, before 
any public comment or discussion has been allowed.  Apparently, the 
Administration is going to use its leverage to get all telephone 
equipment vendors to adopt a voice encryption standard developed 
by the National Security Agency. The so-called "Clipper Chip" is an 
80-bit, split key escrowed encryption scheme which will be built into 
chips manufactured by a military contractor.  Two separate escrow 
agents would store users' keys, and be required to turn them over 
law enforcement upon presentation of a valid warrant.  The 
encryption scheme used is to be classified, but they chips will be 
available to any manufacturer for incorporation into their 
communications products.

       This proposal raises a number of serious concerns .

       First, the Administration appears to be adopting a solution 
before conducting an inquiry.  The NSA-developed Clipper chip may 
not be the most secure product. Other vendors or developers may 
have better schemes. Furthermore, we should not rely on the 
government as the sole source for Clipper or any other chips.  Rather,
independent chip manufacturers should be able to produce chipsets 
based on open standards.

       Second, an algorithm can not be trusted unless it can be tested. 
Yet the Administration proposes to keep the chip algorithm 
classified.  EFF believes that any standard adopted ought to be public 
and open.  The public will only have confidence in the security of a 
standard that is open to independent, expert scrutiny.  

       Third, while the use of the split-key, dual-escrowed 
system may prove to be a reasonable balance between privacy and 
law enforcement needs, the details of this scheme must be explored 
publicly before it is adopted.  What will give people confidence in the 
safety of their keys?  Does disclosure of keys to a third party waive 
individual's fifth amendment rights in subsequent criminal 
inquiries?  

       In sum, the Administration has shown great sensitivity to the 
importance of these issues by planning a comprehensive inquiry into 
digital privacy and security.  However, the "Clipper chip" solution 
ought to be considered as part of the inquiry, not be adopted before 
the discussion even begins.

DETAILS OF THE PROPOSAL:

ESCROW

The 80-bit key will be divided between two escrow agents, each of 
whom hold 40 bits of each key.  Upon presentation of a valid 
warrant, the two escrow agents would have to turn the key parts 
over to law enforcement agents.  Most likely the Attorney General 
will be asked to identify appropriate escrow agents.  Some in the 
Administration have suggested one non-law enforcement federal 
agency, perhaps the Federal Reserve, and one non-governmental 
organization.  But, there is no agreement on the identity of the agents 
yet.

Key registration would be done by the manufacturer of the 
communications device.  A key is tied to the device, not to the person 
using it.

CLASSIFIED ALGORITHM AND THE POSSIBILITY OF BACK DOORS

The Administration claims that there are no back door means by 
which the government or others could break the code without 
securing keys from the escrow agents and that the President will 
be told there are no back doors to this classified algorithm.  In order 
to prove this, Administration sources are interested in arranging for 
an all-star crypto cracker team to come in, under a security 
arrangement, and examine the algorithm for trap doors.  The results 
of the investigation would then be made public.

GOVERNMENT AS MARKET DRIVER


In order to get a market moving, and to show that the government 
believes in the security of this system, the feds will be the first big 
customers for this product.  Users will include the FBI, Secret Service, 
VP Al Gore, and maybe even the President. 

FROM MORE INFORMATION CONTACT:

Jerry Berman, Executive Director
Daniel J. Weitzner, Senior Staff Counsel

...

=============================================================

     EFFector Online is published by
     The Electronic Frontier Foundation
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     Internet Address: eff@eff.org
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 Reproduction of this publication in electronic media is encouraged.
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 To reproduce signed articles individually, please contact the authors
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------- End of Forwarded Message

--
Joseph Truitt * BioCAD Corporation * joseph@biocad.com * voice 415/903-3923
fax 415/961-0584 * "The hardest thing in the world to understand is the
income tax."  --Albert Einstein