From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Tue, 13 Apr 93 00:21:26 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: Modem encryption proposal
Message-ID: <9304130721.AA29941@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Crypto synchronization seems to be a problem mainly in real-time
appliations like digital voice, where you don't have a reliable
protocol underneath you.

I advocate two approaches that don't seem to have been pursued much
yet, at least in the Internet: per-packet encryption (and possibly)
authentication) just above the IP layer, and stream encryption just
above TCP.

The former technique has the advantage of denying your adversary the
maximum amount of information, because only the IP header is in the
clear.  The transport header and all user data is protected, so an
eavesdropper can't tell which applications are communicating. And with
IP-in-IP encapsulation, you can even deny him knowledge about which
machines are actually communicating - a network-level service
analogous to anonymous remailers. With authentication, network level
security also provides good protection against replay attacks.

The latter technique (encrypting above TCP) has the advantage of being
more efficient (it doesn't break Van Jacobson TCP/IP header
compression), which may make it desirable for some interactive
sessions. This is essentially how encrypted Kerberos Telnet works now,
although I would like to generalize the service to work with any TCP
client.

Phil