From: zane@genesis.mcs.com (Sameer Parekh)
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 06:35:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CLIP: Revised sample letter
Message-ID: <m0nlINS-000MVQC@genesis.mcs.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


	I finished my letter about the wiretap chip. (I still need to proof
for grammar, but the content I have set.)
	I'm posting it here so others may see it and their efforts could be
aided. Feel free to distribute this AS MUCH as possible. If you want to
comment on the letter, so so publicly, because I am sending this tomorrow
morning and sending to me privately will do no good-- I will have sent it by
the time I read your comments. Comments *will* be helpful though for other
people.

	I will keep the lists informed as to what response I get from my
letter if people wish.

-- 
| Sameer Parekh-zane@genesis.MCS.COM-PFA related mail to pfa@genesis.MCS.COM |
| Apprentice Philosopher, Writer, Physicist, Healer, Programmer, Lover, more |
| "Be God" - Me __ "Specialization is for Insects" - Robert A. Heinlein ____/


Editor:

	The Clinton administration on Friday unveiled their plan for
establishing a standard data encryption system for voice communications.
President Clinton says that he wants to bring the United States
into the twenty-first century. This proposal is bringing us to 1984. I
will mention first the technical reasons why the system is inadequate.
	The encryption algorithim is classified; only a select group of
people will be allowed to examine the algorithim for flaws. The members
of the cryptographic community continually and persistently emphasize
that the only way to ensure security in a cryptographic system is to
have as many people as possible analyze and try to break it for as long
as possible. A system which has been examined by a small segment of the
population should not be trusted.
	Release of the algorithim is crucial to verification of a good
encryption method. The earlier Data Encryption Standard (DES) for data
storage encryption was a very strong standard; the academic world
examined it and after a number of months found weaknesses, spawning the
now-standard "triple-DES" system which is more secure.
	From what little is known about the encryption system, it
appears to be a weak system. Such a weak system lends itself to
easy decryption by an unauthorized party. It would lend a false sense of
security to laypersons in the field who do not realize that a key of
such simplicity could be cracked easily by any talented criminal. The
necessarily secure communications between a doctor and his patient could
be thus breached. If the system were strong, the government would use it
for internal use, but according to the AT&T release, the government will
not be using the same chip which is marketed to consumers.
	Apart from the technical flaws in the system, there are many
political problems with this big brother proposal. First, there is the
assumption that the government has a right to spy on its own citizens.
The proposal for this wiretap chip includes the registration of keys
with two escrow agencies.  This proposal is purported to allow law
enforcement to keep track of "terrorists" and "drug-dealers." The first
flaw in this key-escrow system is that no self-respecting criminal will
use a cryptography system which can be easily tapped by law enforcement
officials-- they will use strong cryptography. The only people who
may end up using the wiretap encryption system will be law-abiding
laypeople who don't fully understand cryptography. (Law-abiding citizens
who do understand cryptography will use strong cryptography to preserve
their privacy from a talented criminal.) 
	The proposal states that in order to obtain the key of a wiretap
chip user a law enforcement agency must first establish that they have a
valid interest in the key. Translated out of legalese, that means that
all a government agency will have to do to get access to all of the
private communications, for example, between a lawyer and her client
will be to fill out the necessary forms. Registering cryptographic keys
with the government is similar to giving the IRS the keys to your house
and filing cabinet. A criminal who wants access to the communications
between a priest and confessor needs only to find a corrupt judge.
	The chip is being manufactured exclusively by one company. The
release stated that the Attorney shall request (i.e. coerce)
telecommunication product manufacturers to use this product.  This
aspect of the system is a government-mandated monopoly. Such monopolies
result in high prices and the elimination of market forces which drive
the improvement of technology. (One needs only look at the state of the
Soviet Union to see how the lack of market forces affects consumer
technology.)
	The system exposes our President's hypocrasy because of his
campaign promise to protect womens' rights to privacy and that he will
see a Supreme Court nominee who believes that the Bill of Rights
guarantees a right to privacy. By mandating a weak cryptosystem he is
reneging on his promise to provide privacy rights to the nation's
citizenry. If Clinton supported a right to privacy to limit government
interference with regards to abortions, he must limit government
interference with regards to communication.
	Another element of Clinton's hypocrasy lies in his promise to
reduce the budget deficit. By introducing additional responsibilities
for government agencies (keeping track of the millions of keys
registered in escrow) he is only using our tax dollars to invade our
privacy, tax dollars which are better spent lowering the budget deficit.
	What I fear most from the proposal is that if the wiretap chip
becomes the standard, strong cryptography will be declared illegal. If
such is the case, then only criminals will have access to strong
cryptography. As I have stated above-- the wiretap chip will not be used
by criminals because of the obvious flaws in the crypto-system--
criminals will use strong crypto, while law-abiding citizens will have
to use a system which can be easily defeated by any criminal.
	Strong cryptography already exists for data communications, for
-free-. Strong cryptography for voice communications for -free- is only
a few months away for people who own a personal computer. There is no
way that making strong cryptography illegal will stop it-- it will only
turn otherwise law-abiding citizens into criminals.


			Sincerely,

			Sameer Parekh
			829 Paddock Lane
			Libertyville, IL 60048-3743
			zane@genesis.mcs.com
			708-362-9659