1993-06-02 - Clipper

Header Data

From: RYAN Alan Porter <ryan@rtfm.mlb.fl.us>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 7dba342107540c998b17656e92f7a60e5567581d47264ea8582d9a9d5f521619
Message ID: <Pine.3.03.9306020009.B6908-c100000@rtfm>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1993-06-02 04:34:13 UTC
Raw Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 21:34:13 PDT

Raw message

From: RYAN Alan Porter <ryan@rtfm.mlb.fl.us>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 21:34:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Clipper
Message-ID: <Pine.3.03.9306020009.B6908-c100000@rtfm>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Just out of curiosity, does anyone on the cypherpunks list posess the
technical skills that would be necessary to begin a project of hacking out
a pin compatible version of the Clipper that didn't have the backdoors
once the chip is out, a la AMD and CYRIX?

If not, it would seem that we need to get some hardware geeks involved, as
well as all of these software people around here, since crypto issues are
moving more and more into the hardware, VLSI playing field.

("Cypherpunks write code.... and microcode"??)

It would seem that one of the most direct ways to attack Clipper would be
to pull another PGP, just create a chip that acts just like one, but a
chip that we understand and we designed.

There would be totally different problems involved, the Feds could much
more easily seize chip production facilities, design would be more
difficult, free distribution would be more difficult...

I think that it would be quite possible, however.  I mean, if an attack is
truly to be made on the Clipper, writing letters to feds certainly won't
help, the only thing that will help is making their proposal ineffective
and uneconomical.

Think about it, if a truly secure chip existed, it's sale would be almost
certain; all of the 'criminals' that the feds are so afraid of would be
sure to find us and buy one, not to mention every self respecting
cypherpunk and cyberpunk in the universe, law enforcement agencies might
even get into buying black market chips to protect themselves from escrow
leaks...

Also, if all of these shady types that the feds are using for their
tactical arguments have truly secure chips anyway, all of the
aformentioned arguments are rendered moot.

So I guess the really important question is: does anybody know how to
reverse engineer a chip and build a duplicate, pin-compatible device from
the ground up while hiding from the feds the whole time and still managing
to make a living?

I guess that's a pretty rough question, but hey, this is war, right?


-Ryan
the Bit Wallah









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