From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Mon, 21 Jun 93 15:56:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: one reaction: early FOIA results
In-Reply-To: <9306212130.AA19632@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9306212255.AA29611@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>The industry argues persuasively that overseas markets
>(much less drug lords or spies) will not look with favor on U.S.
>products which have known trapdoors when offshore products
>which do not have them are available.  [...]  These charges are true.

I'm really amazed how unbiased these letters are. In fact, maybe they
were designed to be suitable for FOIA release. There is none of the
one-sided propaganda tone of the Clipper announcement.  Virtually all
the critical arguments *against* Clipper (which can always be taken in
parallel as criticisms of the current NSA role) are present -- except
for the constitutionality of its introduction or enforcement. The
arguments `against' are even labelled `true' and `persuasive'. I wonder
if any of this means anything. It could just be a gimmick to suggest
that `all concerns were fairly balanced in the proposal'. Does anyone
suppose that the important military aides anticipate FOIA requests and
come up with bland and benign documents to satisfy them?

>The law enforcement and national security communities ...
> propose that
> cryptography be made available and *required* which contains a
> "trapdoor" that would allow law enforcement and national security
> officials, under proper supervision, to decrypt enciphered
> communications.

For the first time we have an official confirmation that the original
intent of Clipper (or similar technology) was to make it *mandatory*. 
I think this is rather ironic considering many of the apologist's
current main rationalizations (Denning, Sternlight, etc.) that it is a
`voluntary' program.  Caveat Emptor!

>at least AT&T has been
>reported willing to do so (having been suitably incentivised by
>promises of Government purchases).

`incentivised' -- a cute euphemism for collusion.  I wonder to what
extent they were `incentivised'.

>(U)	The President has also directed that the fact that law
>enforcement officials will have access to the keys will not be
>concealed from the public.  National security officials are not
>mentioned.

eeks, that sounds amazingly ominous. Why would they say in one sentence
`law enforcement officials have access to the keys' and then in the
next `the security of the scheme for national security purposes is not revealed'?

>In the meantime, DoD has trapdoor technology ...

wow, they call Clipper `trapdoor technology' -- great PR, for us.

>These same advances threaten the
>capabilities of law enforcement and national security operations that
>intercept the communications of narcotraffickers, organized
>criminals, terrorists, espionage agents of foreign powers and a broad
>range of SIGINT targets.

`narcotraffickers' -- doesn't sound as hysterically paranoid as `drug
dealers'. Also, first time I've heard SIGINT and `espionage agents of
foreign powers' mentioned `officially' relative to Clipper (although of
course that intent was obvious). Just another effective death threat on
Clipper, because it will have the absolute *least* effect in foreign countries.

>A highly-emotional, spirited public debate
>is likely.

hehe, it's the NSA that is highly emotional. I'd say they're shuddering
and crying. OK OK, low blow, sorry.

[proliferation of strong cryptography]
>This would increase the cost
>of performing the SIGINT mission or decrease the amount of
>intelligence, or both.

both. already.

>Thus far, widespread availability has not
>led to widespread use.

hm, how could that be? It wouldn't have anything to do with draconian
export regulations, would it?

So, in short, we have greater confirmation of our worst fears: Clipper
was not just designed to be domestic, the purveyors of Clipper were
considering a *mandatory* scheme from the start, and national
intelligence interests have been obscured intentionally.  Also, we have
many more obfuscations of who `directed' the Clipper approach -- it
claims that the president did. This phrasing is very critical,
understand, because the NSA has no authority to make such a proposal,
and they must continue to assert that it was originated by the
Executive branch for it to have any semblance of legitimacy.  Note how
they always evade mention of *which* president, it is just The
President.  (Or as Sternlight once told me, The Whitehouse.)

>A highly-emotional, spirited
>public debate is likely.

Hm. This from a letter dated April 30, Clipper released April 16. Is
this a `reaction' or an `anticipation'?  This terminology overall
closely mirrors the Clipper announcement. Blacked out sections
presumably contain arguments on NSA capabilities relative to the new
technology.  Things like `the proliferation of strong cryptography is a
very serious threat to the continued existence of the agency' and `a
major current trend of diminuition and erosion in signal interception
capabilities can be identified.'

It seems to me that the next major threat will be something
approximating a mandatory scheme using cloaked terminology (e.g.  under
the guise of `regulating the industry' and `protecting the consumer')
as I wrote on sci.crypt.  I think we really have to drive home the
point that any mandatory scheme is fundamentally unconstitutional. This
little epiphany apparently has not occured to anyone who matters in the
development of Clipper policy yet.


BTW what is the significance of two copies of the same letter here?

p.s. special thanks to J. Gilmore for this critical information.