1993-08-23 - Re: Attacks on remailers

Header Data

From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 1af1806df231a804857c91f2782df8ba0b404652403c82a22f542c539e15ce1d
Message ID: <9308231757.ZM12740@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
Reply To: <9308230602.AA25533@jobe.shell.portal.com>
UTC Datetime: 1993-08-23 22:01:39 UTC
Raw Date: Mon, 23 Aug 93 15:01:39 PDT

Raw message

From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Mon, 23 Aug 93 15:01:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Attacks on remailers
In-Reply-To: <9308230602.AA25533@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9308231757.ZM12740@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Aug 22, 11:02pm, hfinney@shell.portal.com wrote:
> Subject: Attacks on remailers

Please pardon the previous mail.  My new mailer's "send" button jumped into
the path of my mouse and got run down.

--------------------------------------------------

The best protection against traffic analysis I've seen is to make sure that
there is no information available from the traffic content, timing or
volume.

The first can be done by encrypting all header information, as well as
message contents.  Thanks to public-key, we have a chance to do that.

The others can be handled by making sure that the traffic timing and volume
are constant.  The luxurious way to do this is by keeping a continuous
traffic stream going.  We could do this more economically by sending daily
messages (same time(s) each day) of constant length -- both between each of
us and each remailer and between the remailers.  This limits the maximum
bandwidth per person but clobbers traffic analysis.

- Carl







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