From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: f8b1dc8dc3c0f5b43682e6d54747cf8ca020ee502cb7c3464b75f1e9d80f138e
Message ID: <m0oN43f-0009G8C@mindvox.phantom.com>
Reply To: <930802165408_72114.1712_FHF34-1@CompuServe.COM>
UTC Datetime: 1993-08-02 17:48:52 UTC
Raw Date: Mon, 2 Aug 93 10:48:52 PDT
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Mon, 2 Aug 93 10:48:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: SKIPJACK PANEL
In-Reply-To: <930802165408_72114.1712_FHF34-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <m0oN43f-0009G8C@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
Sandy Sandford writes:
>
> Is it just me, or is anyone else dubious about Dorothy Dennings
> and company running their various Skipjack tests ON AN *NSA*
> CRAY COMPUTER? Since many of the objections to the whole plan
> arouse because of doubts about the intentions of the NSA, why
> would D.D. et al. trust them to run these critical tests? How
> difficult would it be for the NSA to spoof its own computer?
>
> Next big news items: United Nations hires Serbian troops to
> report on human rights violations in Bosnia. Farmer Brown puts
> fox in charge of henhouse. Film at eleven.
This is but one of the obvious flaws in the whole Clipper scheme.
I think the whole Clipper debate can be boiled down to this one
important fact:
* It is not in the interest of the NSA for
Clipper/Skipjack to be secure, therefore
they will find a way to make sure that
either the algorithm or the chip itself
contains a NSA backdoor before the chip
is sold to the American public.
The whole escrow scheme is an obvious wild goose chase as well. We all
know that the NSA operates by importing large amounts of information
(oceans of data) and uses it's computers to extract the goodies. The
would not be able to do this if they had to obtain a warrant for each
conversation that constitutes a part of the ocean of data. The whole
escrow aspect of the system is obviously bogus.
To review: 1) The key escrow aspect is a wild goose chase.
2) The security of the algorithm is also a wild goose chase.
3) The backdoor must be in the chip hardware itself.
Therefore even if Clinton and the NSA deside to make the two key escrow
agents the E.F.F. and the A.C.L.U, and Denning and her crew declare the
algorithm to be secure, I will still advocate a complete boycott of the
Clipper/Skipjack technology because the backdoor will be in those
tamper-proof chips.
Thug
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