From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 0465960dce93a099c0190924d68c5fe374d0e0e2555fc092ede85b256cf340dc
Message ID: <9310040200.AA12533@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1993-10-04 02:04:34 UTC
Raw Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 19:04:34 PDT
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 19:04:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Single Value Pseudonyms
Message-ID: <9310040200.AA12533@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
> Karl Barrus posted this, and I've been meaning to respond to it.
> Basically Karl's scheme doesn't work. With any cut-and-choose
> protocol, there must be some assurance that the two things offered
What? It doesn't work? Care to elaborate?
I mean, a person can satisfy to any degree desired that the last
unblinded document is of a particular value.
I agree that it becomes real expensive to do so, and for digital
banking purposes, there are several alternatives: 1) all cash is of
same denomination, 2) different exponents for different
denominations, 3) different keys for different denominations.
I think I mentioned the application towards digital cash is a bit
forced because of the above. The real point is in avoiding signing
a blinded document that is later unblinded to reveal something
undesirable, in which case the signature and the document signed
have value. The application of cut-and-choose I described applies
best when for some reason (poor choices of the bank?) the document
itself contains value, like the denomination it represents.
--
Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu
keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5 3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32
"One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography"
- my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories
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1993-10-04 (Sun, 3 Oct 93 19:04:34 PDT) - Re: Single Value Pseudonyms - Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>