From: catalyst-remailer@netcom.com
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 18:07:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Crypto Anarchy (jrk@...)
Message-ID: <9310190102.AA12700@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


smb@research.att.com wrote:

>Do you want an example?  Here's how to shut down an anonymous remailer.
>First, find a name for a host that no longer exists.  Send a note through
>the remailer to someone putatively on that host, making it appear like
>a stolen account (bin@foo.bar.edu, or some such).  The mail should appear
>to discuss criminal activity, and be signed with a name from the proper
>ethnic group.  The message will be queued forever, of course, and will
>likely be stored on the backup tapes for the mail spool directory.  Next,
>send a message through the remailer to president@whitehouse.gov, threatening
>the president.  Poof -- the Secret Service *will* come investigating
>(those guys have no sense of humor).  They may or may not believe that
>the planted note is genuine.  But they will approach the appropriate dean
>to demand that this tool of criminal activity be shut down.

Well, this apocraphyl scene is easily avoided - remailers can be
configured to refuse remailing to whitehouse.gov.

But then this is the Secret Service.  Are they more likely to
a) seize all equipment peripherally related and a bunch that isn't
b) inquire about having anonymous mail blocked

Undoubtedly we could launch into a discussion of why it is anybody
with a pocket full of change can walk up to a payphone and leave a
variety of threats at the whitehouse switchboard - the phone
company need not fear having its equipment seized, while a computer
used in forwarding mail containing the same threats will probably be
taken along with anything else the SS feels like taking.

>Quick -- how many remailers have the support of the university?  How many
>boards of trustees -- at state universities, often linked to the government
>-- will back them, if the Secret Service ``requests'' that they be shut
>down.

Gee, I don't know.  Does the phone company have any government deals,
say to manufacture products using a government designed chip, that may
be at risk if its found out that phone company equipment is constantly
being used for threats??

The point is we are in a research & development stage (if you will)
with anonymous remailers, reputations, filters, digital cash, dc-nets,
etc.  It is very likely that the projected reality, desired reality,
and actual reality will be quite different; nevertheless,
experimentation continues.