From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 20:42:37 PDT
To: pierre@shell.portal.com (Pierre Uszynski)
Subject: Re: DC-nets, up from the basic concept
In-Reply-To: <9310262234.AA05579@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <199310270336.AA03949@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



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pierre@shell.portal.com (Pierre Uszynski) writes:
[regarding DC nets...]
> 
> Q: How do you implement the idea that I can see my coin
> and the coin on the left, but no others?
> 
> A: You use public key cryptography. You join a "table"
> by contacting one of the persons already at the "table".
> He hands you address and public key of (say) his
> right neighbor, and you hand him your address and your
> public key.

Danger Will Robinson!

The only danger you really face in being revealed through a DC net is when
you are isolated by colluders on the graph.  I know who the people to my
left and right are.  If I am colluding with either one of them and you ask
to join the network I am on I will say "sure...you talk to person X" (my
colluder) and you are now completely screwed.

There are other options for network formation and joining, and I would
recommend against this one...


[regarding responsibility for messages and implication...]
> 
> It would be different (even with todays networks), if
> a large proportion of the messages were CLEARLY illegal.

Remember that on the net "legality" is often a _local_ thing.  With a DC
network consisting of participants from several different countries things
might get very interesting, because it would be imposible to determine who
a message came from and therefore who has jursidiction or even if any law
was broken...

jim

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