1993-10-19 - Knapsack Cryptosystems

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From: Brian A. LaMacchia <bal@martigny.ai.mit.edu>
To: an41418@anon.penet.fi
Message Hash: 428670301d0e9d10f7788d07ba54b2446e21400d83d07f087892f86611bbfb89
Message ID: <9310191935.AA17292@toad.com>
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UTC Datetime: 1993-10-19 19:37:31 UTC
Raw Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 12:37:31 PDT

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From: Brian A. LaMacchia <bal@martigny.ai.mit.edu>
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 12:37:31 PDT
To: an41418@anon.penet.fi
Subject: Knapsack Cryptosystems
Message-ID: <9310191935.AA17292@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   From: smb@research.att.com
   To: an41418@anon.penet.fi
   Cc: cypherpunks@toad.com
   Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 04:34:58 EDT

For a good survey paper of knapsack cryptosystems, see [1].

   Third -- and this is what sunk the knapsack problem -- you need a
   cryptosystem that exploits the full NP-complete problem, as opposed
   to just a simple case.  (The knapsack problem was solvable by someone
   who knew the key because it wasn't a general knapsack, but a super-
   increasing sequence -- each number in it was greater than the sum
   of all of its predecessors.  (This was the simplest version; there
   were, I believe, some others.))

Even knapsack cryptosystems that exploit the full NP-complete problem
may still be susceptible to general attacks, depending on their density
(a property of the weights of the knapsack problem).  If the weights
$a_i$ are too large, you get a "low-density knapsack" (i.e. you're
sending lots of bits of cyphertext to hide few bits of plaintext).

Brickell [2] and Lagarias and Odlyzko [3] showed that there are general
attacks against subset-sum problems with density < 0.6463...  In [4] we
showed that this bound can be improved to about 0.9408...  Joux and
Stern came up with essentially the same result at about the same time
[5].  (Note that if your density is > 1, then you have the possibility
of two different plaintexts encrypting to the same ciphertext.  Without
more information, the encryption can be ambiguous.)

We combined our two techniques in a joint paper -- you can get it via
anon. FTP from martigny.ai.mit.edu in pub/bal/sumcc.ps, if you're
interested. 

					--bal

References:

[1] A. M. Odlyzko, The rise and fall of knapsack cryptosystems, {\it
Cryptology and Computational Number Theory}, C. Pomerance, ed., Am.
Math. Soc., Proc. Symp. Appl. Math. {\bf 42} (1990), 75-88.

[2] E. F. Brickell, Solving low density knapsacks, {\it Advances in
Cryptology, Proceedings of Crypto '83}, Plenum Press, New York (1984),
25-37.

[3] J. C. Lagarias and A. M. Odlyzko, Solving low-density subset sum
problems, {\it J. Assoc. Comp. Mach.\/} {\bf 32(1)} (January 1985),
229-246.

[4] M. J. Coster, B. A. LaMacchia, A. M. Odlyzko and C. P. Schnorr, An
improved low-density subset sum algorithm, {\it Advances in Cryptology:
Proceedings of Eurocrypt '91}, D. Davies, ed., to appear.

[5] A. Joux and J. Stern, Improving the critical density of the
Lagarias-Odlyzko attack against subset sum problems, to be published.





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