1993-10-20 - defeating traffic analysis

Header Data

From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 8ee9b302e51cb5f647a2833c431eae91ccdc368342717f0f9aa5bd8dd65cfaed
Message ID: <9310201404.AA26853@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1993-10-20 14:07:42 UTC
Raw Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 07:07:42 PDT

Raw message

From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 07:07:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: defeating traffic analysis
Message-ID: <9310201404.AA26853@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 22:43:46 PDT
>From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
>Message-Id: <9310200543.AA22959@jobe.shell.portal.com.shell.portal.com>
>Subject: Re: JUDGMENT PROOFING

>This is exactly what anonymous remailers are for - to defeat traffic
>analysis.  The goal is a situation where you, and everyone else, receives
>and sends out a bunch of encrypted traffic every day.  There will be
>no way a snooper can find out exactly what you are reading, what you
>are writing, or whom you are communicating with.  That's what I call
>private.

To really defeat traffic analysis you also have to remove any information
from volume of traffic.  If I don't know any message routing but I do know
that cme sent 10 MB of traffic and you received 10 MB of traffic and the
other 30 people on the anon subnet dealt with only 100B each, ....

So:  have everyone send and receive exactly the same size message to/from the
same sites at the same time every day.


 - Carl





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