From: smb@research.att.com
To: “Alan (Gesture Man) Wexelblat” <wex@media.mit.edu>
Message Hash: 16fb9fefd1a8f128fa5d81644297cd4f793ffb64feaded4837b6af1d5d57e5e3
Message ID: <9311181739.AA14588@toad.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1993-11-18 17:41:31 UTC
Raw Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 09:41:31 PST
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 09:41:31 PST
To: "Alan (Gesture Man) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>
Subject: Re: hohocon
Message-ID: <9311181739.AA14588@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
It seems to me that a simpler solution than challenge-response
would be to emultate the tear-sheet crypto systems and just
have a series of one-shot passwords generated. Each time you
log in, it requires the next password from the sheet, so
capturing the old one does no good (just as breaking the
one-time codes from tear sheets doesn't help).
Now if I could just figure out a simple way to do this on
UNIX...
See
@article{lamport-pw,
author = {Leslie Lamport},
journal = {Communications of the ACM},
month = {November},
number = 11,
pages = {770--772},
title = {Password Authentciation with Insecure Communication},
volume = 24,
year = 1981
}
The Bellcore S-Key system implements this scheme, and is, I think,
freely available. I know that it's included in TIS's firewall toolkit:
\software{ftp.tis.com}{/pub/firewalls/toolkit}
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1993-11-18 (Thu, 18 Nov 93 09:41:31 PST) - Re: hohocon - smb@research.att.com