From: baldwin@LAT.COM (Bob Baldwin)
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 13:32:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Duress Passwords/PINs/Combinations
Message-ID: <9311182123.AA14221@LAT.COM>
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	Having a separate authentication mechanism that is used
under duress is a very good idea that some existing systems already
employ.  I'll pass along the ones I have had contact with.  From a
systems point of view, it is hard to figure out exactly how the system
should respond when it recognizes a duress authentication.  There are
competing interests as I'll explain after some examples.
	The safe inside the ATM machines used by BayBanks (Boston Mass)
can be opened with two combinations.  One combination sends an alarm
to the bank via a separate phone line (not the one used to perform the
ATM transaction).  The alarm phone line is also connected to a conventional
panic switch.
	A fellow I know has a central-office alarm in his home.  When the
alarm goes off, the office calls his house to ask if it was a false
alarm.  They ask for a password to verify, and no matter what password
you give they say "OK, I'll log it as a false alarm."  If you gave the
wrong password, they call the police and notify them of a crime in
progress with hostages.  If no one answers the phone, they send one of
their patrol cars.
	The challenge-response token that Attalla sells (which is a
repackaging of someone else's token) supports a fixed or variable duress
pin.  In the fixed duress pin mode, a special PIN, usually "1111", causes
the device to use a fixed different key to compute the response to
the challenge.  The code that authenticates the response checks for a
use of the duress key if the response does not correspond to the value
expected for the user's key.  The variable duress PIN approach is a feature 
of the card where the user can set which PIN value causes the card
to use the alternate key.  From a software point of view, the authentication
procedure returns Yes/No/Duress.  Note it is possible to have a collision
between a duress response and a regular response.
	The competing interest problem is illustrated by the following
possibility:  A criminal makes an ATM money-filler open the safe at gun point
(the ATM repair people do not know the safe combination).  The
criminal says that she knows about the duress combination and threatens to
shoot the kneecaps off the person if they use the duress combination.  The
criminal will take the money-filler hostage for a few minutes to guarantee
a clean get-away.  So what does the money-filler do?  To use the duress
combination requires faith that the bank will handle the situation in
a subtle way and thus avoid major knee surgery.  For the bank, why risk
loosing any money or loosing the criminal.  In fact, why not just refuse
to open the safe in the first place?  What is the right balance between
these interests?  How does each party trust that the other will behave
as expected?  What is the benefit of this approach when the criminals
already know about it?  It works well against criminals that don't know
about it, but is that enough to justify the overhead?
	These questions are not show stoppers.  Individual organizations
can and do answer them in order to make rational choices about duress
authentication.
	In the cases of communicating cells, the key benefit is giving
the adjacent nodes time to cleanup their surroundings of evidence or
to totally "leave town".
		--Bob