1993-11-30 - Re: Cryptosplit 2.0

Header Data

From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
To: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Message Hash: e5eb072f4f22f1a90a86bd94722a6708ae8692e82874b7da28534cfa09fa4abd
Message ID: <9311301342.AA25298@vail.tivoli.com>
Reply To: <199311300256.AA05265@misc.glarp.com>
UTC Datetime: 1993-11-30 13:47:28 UTC
Raw Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 05:47:28 PST

Raw message

From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 05:47:28 PST
To: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Subject: Re: Cryptosplit 2.0
In-Reply-To: <199311300256.AA05265@misc.glarp.com>
Message-ID: <9311301342.AA25298@vail.tivoli.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Brad Huntting writes:
 > If I remember coorectly it's KerberosV uses an MD5 hash of /dev/mem.
 > 
 > Still, probably not 128 bits worth of entropy.

Gee, that seems pretty amazing.  On a typical workstation, there's a
heck of a lot going on; in the megabytes of data in /dev/mem I'd think
it quite unlikely that there's a practical way to predict or recreate
a configuration.

Then again, I could be wrong.  I also wonder how, if the above is
true, one can really get 128 bits of entropy from keyboard timing
(especially from a small number of keypresses).

--
Mike McNally : m5@tivoli.com : Day Laborer : Tivoli Systems : Austin, TX
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Remember that all experimentation does not produce extrapolated results.
                                                           - k. pisichko





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