From: rclark@nyx10.cs.du.edu (Robert W. F. Clark)
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 93 10:33:54 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Provisional Internet Draft:  Reputation Servers
Message-ID: <9312091831.AA24427@nyx10.cs.du.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Provisional Internet Draft

Reputation Servers

1.  Status of this document:  This document has not been 
    submitted to any formal groups and is merely a draft
    for a future official draft.  All comments concerning
    this draft should be sent to rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu
    (Robert Clark).

2.  Background:  Many eminent persons have discussed the
    need for a more methodological process of screening
    mailing lists and newsgroups through reputation
    markets.  This document attempts to move toward
    the accomplishment of that goal, by defining it.

    For a reputation server to have any true worth,
    it must be a market.  To avoid the 'rigging' of
    the market by means of false purchasing and sale
    of reputation by numerous pseudonymous entities,
    all messages to the server must be signed with
    PGP keys themselves, and those which are questionable
    shall be themselves counted.

    Those who choose not to sign their messages will
    be limited to the informational aspects of the server.

    A desirable but not strictly necessary aspect of
    a reputation server would be the ability to rate
    the initial 'buying power' of any particular key
    according to degrees of trustworthiness.

3.  Recent Developments

[This section is empty; if anyone knows of any repserver
software which preexists this draft, please alert the
author.]

4.  Summary of Reputation Server:  The author intends
    within 180 days of the writing of this draft to
    implement at least a rudimentary reputation server
    with the following functions:

        a)  Accepts only encrypted and signed 'sales' [*] and
        'purchases', with either PGP or other public-key
        software.

        b)  Gives 'buying' power directly according to
        the amount of 'reputation stock' bought by
        others.

        c)  Can mark certain users as being sufficiently
        lacking in 'reputation capital' to effect
        'public opinion.'

      * d)  Can filter a mailing list, public or private.

[* indicates features which would be desirable but are
   not necessary.]

The use of a single-quote indicates that the term used is
used in an abstract way, and not as it is used in conversation.
'Public opinion' is a gestalt of the 'sales' and 'purchases'
made by the participants in the market.

Others can use the market for informational purposes, but
will not affect the 'market value' of certain personalities.

5.  Basis of the Market

Each 'personality' which registers with the reputation
market, by sending a PGP-signed and encrypted message,
using the public key of the server, starts with a fixed
sum of 'money' and a fixed price for their 'reputation
stock.'  

Using one's initial allotment of funds, one can 
choose not to use it, accruing interest (which can
be negative or positive, depending on whether the
average 'value' of all 'personalities' is decreasing
or increasing.

Otherwise, one can invest the 'cash' in the reputation
of others, deciding at that time how much that 'stock'
is worth.  The method of implementation allows an 
early poster with no 'reputation capital' to make
a small change in the 'public opinion,' whereas a 
user with great 'reputation capital' has great
influence on the stocks of others.

A user of the system can choose to set the
asking price of their 'stock' at any value,
or can sell only a part of it, or not sell
it at all.  However, having stock and not
transferring it to 'reputation capital,'
while safe, is not very 'profitable.'

As an example:

User X, a new user, begins with a reputation value
of 1000.  He immediately invests 990 units of 'value'
in one 'share' of User Y, with a reputation value of 5000.   

As Y has sold 99 'shares' for an average of 990, and has
set 990 as a minimum asking price for his stock, the 
'value' of an individual 'share' of Y 'stock' has remained
identical.  The result of this is that the 'reputation
capital' of Y has increased by 990, Y's shares available
to sell are 0.

Y is, of course, free to purchase back her own stock;
or free to purchase some of X's.          

[This is an incomplete definition of the market,
which is to be improved in later versions of
the draft.  Those with better suggestions as
to the implementation of the market, with less
reliance upon the user to figure out 'proper'
asking prices for 'shares' of 'reputation stock,'
are welcomed to mail the author.]

6.  Overview and Summation:  A reputation market could server
    a valuable function, and prove to be another example of
    how secure crypto can be not only fashionable but functional
    as well.

    Not just drug dealers and terrorists need strong crypto,
    just as not just criminals need the Bill of Rights.
    The fact that both systems aid members of both groups
    simply indicates that strong crypto is good for
    _everyone_.

Thank you.
----
rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu


6. Summation