cryptoanarchy.wiki

Arise, you have nothing to lose but your barbed wire fences!

1993-12-23 - Re: eavesdropping detection

Header Data

From: “George A. Gleason” <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
To: ravage@wixer.bga.com
Message Hash: 7438e15aa1e57917b42da5c50cef6bc93d316fd7ca56741dfeaf291253719636
Message ID: <199312230827.AAA04360@well.sf.ca.us>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1993-12-23 08:29:35 UTC
Raw Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 00:29:35 PST

Raw message

From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 00:29:35 PST
To: ravage@wixer.bga.com
Subject: Re: eavesdropping detection
Message-ID: <199312230827.AAA04360@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re phone taps: forget it.  Anything above amateur level tapping is done via
the central office, where it is simply impossible to detect.  Any device
which claims to detect wiretaps is fraudulent.  I'm speaking from over ten
years' experience in telecom, extensive relevant background, etc.  

Room surveillance: you have to be *really* up to something to be targeted 
for this.  Unlikely at best; but he earlier post about spec analysers is 
useful & relevant here.  

Generally: bear in mind that surveillance is incredibly labor intensive at
any level beyond the "vaccuum-cleaner approach" using keyword scans on 
trunks.  Too labor intensive to be conducted unless there is serious 
justification for the cost of the person-hours involved.  

-gg

Thread