From: jim@bilbo (Jim Miller)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 2b96c99c1139aa4ee902f20ee937c06626ef17ab4d8bd29dee100963c1688f60
Message ID: <9401212232.AA06926@bilbo.suite.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1994-01-22 03:56:57 UTC
Raw Date: Fri, 21 Jan 94 19:56:57 PST
From: jim@bilbo (Jim Miller)
Date: Fri, 21 Jan 94 19:56:57 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Remailers: The Next Generation
Message-ID: <9401212232.AA06926@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
> (This is a simplistic equation, which does not take into
> account the practical limitations of there being only so
> many total messages flowing in the system, a point
> addressed briefly below. If only 10 messages "enter the
> system" and 10 messages "leave the system," the attacker
> has an easier problem than than a D = 3125, for example,
> might otherwise suggest.)
>
Since the remailer system works better (harder to track messages) as
message traffic increases, then perhaps the remailers should circulate
bogus messages around the mix in order to sustain a minimum level of
traffic. As more real messages enter the system, the remailers would
decrease the number of bogus messages they issue.
How would a remailer tell the difference between a real message and a
bogus message from another remailer? It wouldn't, but that's ok. All a
given remailer cares about is the number of messages coming in versus the
number messages that constitute a "good" level of traffic. If a remailer
isn't seeing enough traffic, it would issue some bogus messages that would
pass through a random set of remailers and eventually come back to itself.
If all remailers did this, then I think the system, as a whole, would
always have enough messages flowing though it. Real messages would not
have to be delayed to defeat traffic analysis, they could be tossed into
the mix as soon as they arrived at a remailer.
Jim_Miller@suite.com
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