1994-01-31 - An easy-to-create pay-for-use remailer service

Header Data

From: Sameer <sameer@soda.berkeley.edu>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 367247f421f70f47de68e674869bf130e8e38e46f9a71419066c9bb9e1946006
Message ID: <199401311800.KAA16523@soda.berkeley.edu>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1994-01-31 18:03:09 UTC
Raw Date: Mon, 31 Jan 94 10:03:09 PST

Raw message

From: Sameer <sameer@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 31 Jan 94 10:03:09 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: An easy-to-create pay-for-use remailer service
Message-ID: <199401311800.KAA16523@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


	I might set one of these up sometime this fall when I get a
better net connection for my computer.. meanwhile, here's the idea:

	A payforuse anonymous id system.

	Someone would snail mail to me a money order, an
login/aliasname, and a pgp SASE, encrypted with the public key of the
remailer of their choice. (And the address of the remailer of course.)

	I would set up a mail alias which would take incoming mail,
and send it off to the anonymous remailer defined by the user, with
the SASE block thrown in the beginning of the message, and the To:
From:, etc. lines added to the message using the "##" header pasting
mechanism. Accounts would be debited according to the amount of
traffic going through. Once all credit is used up, it would take
another money order with the login/aliasname attached to refill the
account with credit.

	In this way an anonymous persona can have a much more
normal-looking email address, and the operator of the remailer is
still ignorant of the anon-id<=>real-address mapping, to protect
against subpeonas.
	This is just as weak as the remailer-chain used in the SASE
block. The privacy of that will improve as the remailers improve.





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