1994-01-31 - Re: 2-way anonymous via SASE

Header Data

From: “Jon ‘Iain’ Boone” <boone@psc.edu>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 3b70a0f5ba4cd45ad19e4d394b4de435fbb16759f28692d7c8dee67782dd074c
Message ID: <9401312131.AA28744@igi.psc.edu>
Reply To: <9401312056.AA18276@anchor.ho.att.com>
UTC Datetime: 1994-01-31 21:33:10 UTC
Raw Date: Mon, 31 Jan 94 13:33:10 PST

Raw message

From: "Jon 'Iain' Boone" <boone@psc.edu>
Date: Mon, 31 Jan 94 13:33:10 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: 2-way anonymous via SASE
In-Reply-To: <9401312056.AA18276@anchor.ho.att.com>
Message-ID: <9401312131.AA28744@igi.psc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com) writes:
>
> Jon Boone <boone@psc.edu> writes
> >   Isn't it true that no matter how many remailers you use, the full spec
> >   of the return path has to be included?  And if the last remailer is 
> >   keeping a log of all messages passed, then the reciever/replier need
> >   only interrogate the last remailer to find out the sender's address?
> 
> No, the last remailer only needs to know how to send mail to the
> preceeding remailer.  Depending on how fancy a remailer system you're
> using, and whether the recipient or remailer operator can be trusted,
> there are different amounts of work you need to do to get what you want.
> If you're creating 1-shot reply tokens, they can be set to send
> to an address at the n-1th remailer, which anonymizes and adds the address
> for the n-2th remailer, etc.  This gives you reasonable security as long
> as at least one remailer can be trusted and isn't coercible.
> Don't know if anybody's implemented remailers supporting this yet;
> Julf's anon.penet.fi remailer gives a more persistent return address.

  So, you use a chain of anonymous-id's to set up your return-path?

  What if you have a remailer that only assigns you an id for that message
  so that your id is equivalent to (say) the Message-ID (or some portion
  thereof)?  How do you return-path without specifying?

> >  Jon Boone | PSC Networking | boone@psc.edu | (412) 268-6959
> >  finger boone@psc.edu for PGP public key block
> 
> Finger can be faked - including your Key ID or fingerprint in
> your .signature file lets people be more sure it hasn't.
> e.g. >  finger boone@psc.edu for PGP public key block ID #123456
> 
> # Bill Stewart  AT&T Global Information Systems, aka NCR Corp
> # 6870 Koll Center Parkway, Pleasanton CA, 94566 Phone 1-510-484-6204
> # email bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com billstewart@attmail.com
> # ViaCrypt PGP Key IDs 384/C2AFCD 1024/9D6465

 Corrected.  As you might notice below.


 Jon Boone | PSC Networking | boone@psc.edu | (412) 268-6959
 finger boone@psc.edu for PGP public key block #B75699





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