From: michael shiplett <michael.shiplett@umich.edu>
Date: Sat, 12 Feb 94 05:20:49 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Strategies for getting encryption in widespread use QUICKLY
In-Reply-To: <MhL5tSG00VAx02i0hU@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <199402121320.IAA23807@totalrecall.rs.itd.umich.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"mjg" == Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu> writes:

[ auto-install comments deleted...]

mjg> Does anyone want to develop an encrypted term program?  On-the-fly
mjg> encryption over a modem.  This would allow everyone to encrypt very
mjg> easily.  It could support plug-in modules (with signatures) to support
mjg> automatic pgp signing/verification, additional cipher modules (ie DES,
mjg> IDEA, MPJ2).  When logging on to you favorite BBS, instead of typing
mjg> your password in, you enter your account, and then set your encryption
mjg> on your terminal to your password, and if it's right, then you can
mjg> decode the transmission and you are logged on.  That way nobody could
mjg> steal your password (or anything else) by tapping your transmission.

  If the machines to which you want to connect are in a kerberos realm
and you can run TCP/IP (ala PPP or SLIP) on your end, then kerberized
telnet will offer you the ability to

	a) connect to a host without sending your password over the
        connection using a standard kerberos ticket-granting ticket.

	b) encrypt the connection (DES using the session key), so that
	you can, among other things, klog on the remote host without
	the password being sent in the clear.

It should be possible to add other encryption options into ktelnet.

  One might be able to adapt this for BBS use either by modifying
kerberos or by using something like s/key. There's no need for
cleartext passwords to be flying across the wire.

michael