From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 7a5b67a27475b4dbd44ad495ada1d91d1152cce624c5a24a3c7ef95769685fd2
Message ID: <9402020114.AA03481@bilbo.suite.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1994-02-02 01:20:48 UTC
Raw Date: Tue, 1 Feb 94 17:20:48 PST
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Tue, 1 Feb 94 17:20:48 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: SASE Suggestion
Message-ID: <9402020114.AA03481@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Lance Cottrell writes:
> I have been meditating on this problem of return
> addresses, and have a proposal. The remailers
> can not be allowed to choose the return path,
> as any corrupted remailer will corrupt the rest
> of the path.
As I understand it, the remailers don't "chose" the return path, Bob (the
sender of the original message) choses the return path when he creates the
SASE. All the remailers do is interpret the part of the SASE that becomes
readable to them after decrypting the SASE portion sent to them from the
previous hop. If all is working, what becomes readable is the address of
the next hop (closer to Bob) and some misc other stuff (postage, maybe,
and perhaps another encryption key).
Am I not understanding something correctly?
Jim_Miller@suite.com
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1994-02-02 (Tue, 1 Feb 94 17:20:48 PST) - Re: SASE Suggestion - jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)