From: smb@research.att.com
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 998b356682e0bd1498a8b0c8ceb7ab6ce1297dacb7d0ff341173509f170f2bb8
Message ID: <9402181851.AA24808@toad.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1994-02-18 18:55:38 UTC
Raw Date: Fri, 18 Feb 94 10:55:38 PST
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Fri, 18 Feb 94 10:55:38 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: CERT/Whitehouse/Clipper link - smoking gun...
Message-ID: <9402181851.AA24808@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
By God, I knew there was something fishy about that latest CERT
release (the one that referred to things that happened last
November and didn't actually say anything new, but somehow
managed to hit the *WORLD* press extensively within 24 hours)...
It's stuff that's been happening *since* last November. I'm quite
certain that the attacks were continuing until (at the very least)
shortly before the announcement.
PS The statement is also false: digital signatures would have no effect
on network sniffing attacks; but it's just more FUD to strengthen the
Whitehouse hand in a release that was buried in a flood of releases
that day on Clipper.
No, you're wrong. A challenge/response login architecture based on
digital signatures would have eliminated the attack. And digital
signatures -- unlike most other technologies for one-time passwords --
do not require that any secret information be kept on the host.
There are practical difficulties, such as entering in 160 bits of
information, but for host-to-host logins, that isn't much of a problem.
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1994-02-18 (Fri, 18 Feb 94 10:55:38 PST) - Re: CERT/Whitehouse/Clipper link - smoking gun… - smb@research.att.com