1994-02-25 - RE: Clipper Death Threat

Header Data

From: “LYLE, DAVID R. COMPEX” <lyled@pentagon-emh9.army.mil>
To: cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Message Hash: b966eb2abc2be41837e6629716679549bbe2df063131d819d4e28053f4acae49
Message ID: <2D6E535B@Pentagon-EMH9.army.mil>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1994-02-25 16:35:08 UTC
Raw Date: Fri, 25 Feb 94 08:35:08 PST

Raw message

From: "LYLE, DAVID R. COMPEX" <lyled@pentagon-emh9.army.mil>
Date: Fri, 25 Feb 94 08:35:08 PST
To: cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: RE: Clipper Death Threat
Message-ID: <2D6E535B@Pentagon-EMH9.army.mil>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




Sorry, didn't get a chance to finish in my previous message...


 -->4.  How the Clipper implementation infringes on our rights.
 -->

As previous message, it's not a right according to our constitution. 
 However, the argument could be made that public encryption is allowed under 
free speech in a couple of ways:

1) by preventing "the government" from listening in, persons are able to 
speak freely where normally they would not.  This would, of course, be 
superseded by the government's ability to protect itself from treason.  In 
addition, it could be argued that encryption allows people to unlawfully 
speak against others, or to incite riots, etc.

2) it could be argued that an encrypted message is nothing more than 
"another language".  Just because someone can't understand it, does not 
invalidate it.

 -->5.  Arguments for/against Clipper, key escrow, and DoJ implementation.
 -->

"Law enforcement" will always be in favor of having the ability to listen 
in.  That has and always will be of utmost concern to them.

 -->6.  Why public (read congressional) hearings are needed.
 -->    e.g. Administration rationale for clipper.
 -->         Abuse of key escrow.
 -->         Guarantee to alternative encryption.
 -->         Guarantee to import/export of encryption.
 -->

Import/Export.  This one gets tricky.  I can understand the reasons WHY the 
agencies don't want any tech exported.  Any encryption that's exported gets 
in the hands of "enemy agents" and will be worked on to be broken.  The more 
that's out there, the more that's being cracked.  What makes sense to me 
would be for each agency to develop it's OWN proprietary algorithms, which 
already exist, or develop a mix between encryption and virus software such 
that the encryption algorithm actually modifies itself over time.  This may 
ultimately be the "unbreakable" code.

Everything becomes touchy when you speak of national defense.  It is, of 
course, of vital importance.  On the other hand, it's often the most guarded 
"secrets" which are "fake" just to throw off the enemy.  Perhaps this 
clipper thing is just a trick to pull out some more moles.


               Lyled@pentagon-emh9.army.mil
*********************************************************************      -  
 --These are my opinions only, not the opinions of any other entity in 
existence at the pentagon or anywhere else for that matter ----
*********************************************************************





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