From: cfrye@ciis.mitre.org (Curtis D. Frye)
Date: Tue, 8 Feb 94 09:11:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Clipper Opposition
Message-ID: <9402081718.AA04480@ciis.mitre.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Fellow C'punks-

This is a copy of a posting I made to comp.eff.org.talk and other groups.

>-------<
In article <EACHUS.94Feb8105146@spectre.mitre.org> Robert I. Eachus,
eachus@spectre.mitre.org writes:
>In article <strnlghtCKwCrw.DE@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David
>Sternlight) writes:
>
>  > Once they made it voluntary and promised not to outlaw non-Clipper
>  > crypto, the game was over. Arguments about its becoming de facto
>  > standard and driving out other crypto are simply too complex and
>  > iffy to convince the average reader.
>
>     David, this is where you and I part ways.  You believe that the
>adminstration is promising not to outlaw non-Clipper crypto.  But the
>reality is that the adminstration IS and has been trying its damnedest
>to harrass, intimidate, and suppress any alternative strong crypto.
>The current situation--and the recent announcements confirm this--is
>the adminstration requires a special license to export crypto, which
>you CAN'T get to publish strong crypto (And in some cases to publish
>junk crypto.  If I can't publish a public key and the algorithm to use
>it, what good is it?

David does raise a valid point that I don't think Robert deals with - how
does fighting Clipper help us in the struggle to prevent the outlawing of
all non-Clipper crypto?  If the CPSR and other organizations spend their
political capital on a losing fight, does the credibility loss kill
effective future resistance?

While the Clipper proposal *as it stands now* is most likely a done deal,
there are ways to keep up the pressure to make sure it doesn't snowball:

  o  Mount effective resistance against the Wiretap proposal and *link the
two issues* in the eyes of the public.  This shouldn't be done completely
up front - instead, the association should begin to build after a few weeks
or months to ensure that the original message is received and is not
blocked out by the "you already lost Clipper" signal;

  o  Quote export sale figures of Clipper technology often and loud - I
don't see how any foreign company would let such suspect equipment on their
property, let alone use it to transmit anything sensitive.  I truly hope
I'm not wrong on this count - if the tech sells, the case against Clipper
becomes darn near unwinnable;

  o  Track Clipper equipment purchases by US entities that do not have
government contracts;

  o  Maintain close vigilance over the law enforcement community.  How many
mid-level drug dealers would be willing to use Clipper technology to
implicate their bosses in exchange for lighter sentences?  Expect this
tactic and similar ones to be used;

  o  Compile a list and analysis of all crypto software and equipment
available overseas and compare it to commonly used US techniques.  If the
exported stuff has identical or near-identical functionality to the US
tech, there's no case for Clipper.  Combine this analysis with the export
figures and industry is bound to take notice, with their Congressional reps
following. There should be a follow-up analysis on foreign purchases before
and after Clipper is introduced.  THE FIRST PART OF THIS DOCUMENT SHOULD BE
PREPARED IMMEDIATELY!!!  If someone hasn't already begun this survey, I'll
volunteer and will put out a call for information shortly.

This battle needs to be fought on our ground - the Administration is
defining how the argument is being carried out, for now. Do we know what
our ground is?  What strategy we'll take to counter the Administration's
initiative?  The list I just gave is a series of tactical devices that
could produce specific effects, all of which are USELESS without a coherent
strategy to apply the information gained.  Do I have any suggestions? 
Nope, not beyond the tactics I discussed above.  I am, however, going to
start some serious cogitating and hope to come up with something.

That last bit shouldn't be seen as a slam on the EFF or CPSR as I don't
know what level of planning they've invested in strategy.  What I do know
is that we've lost the initiative and need to regain it; these newsgroups
are a great place to start, but most of us agree on the basic principles
that information should be free etc. etc. etc.  Why should Middle America
care what happens to terrorists and dope pushers?  How long until
"electornic privacy advocates" join that elite group?  It isn't time to
push the PANIC BUTTON yet, but there needs to be a heightened sense of
urgency in everything we do to fight against the possibility that the
Administration wants to ban all non-Clipper crypto.

That possibility scares the hell out of me and is enough to make me act
RIGHT NOW!

Curtis Frye
PRIVATE! Citizen

I don't speak for MITRE, they don't speak for me.

>-------<

--
Best regards,

Curtis D. Frye - Economic Analyst, Software Alchemist, Aspiring Author
cfrye@ciis.mitre.org
"If you think I speak for MITRE, I'll tell you how much they
 pay me and make you feel foolish."